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ENTERING THE MODERN WORLD:
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
Amanda L. Blanck*
Introduction
Choosing paths is a part of everyone's life.
Few are restricted to one road, to one choice.
Sometimes the element of choice involved is greater than at other times.
Almost 30 years ago,
many Third World countries decided to increase
the element of choice in their development paths.
They won their independence and started down
their respective paths toward modern industrial
nationhood, waiting to assume their place among
the more established industrial powers. Tunisia
was one such country.
Tunisia's leaders have
accepted a strong, interventionist role in their
nation's industrial development, and the character
of Tunisian industry today is very much the
result of government actions. Out of the various
developmental models to choose from, Tunisia's
leaders have selected a path already traveled by
other developing nations (most notably the Asian
nations) by encouraging industrialization through
a combination of outward-looking growth policies,
the exploitative approach, and especially a process called off-shore production.
As with all
methods, there are advantag·es and disadvantages
to this particular combination of approaches. The
*Amanda is a senior majoring in Political
Science and Anthropology.
She was a 1982-83
Rotary Scholar to Tunisia. She plans on interning with the U.S. State Department's Bureau of
International Organization Affairs this summer.
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problem that arises is thRt of assessing the
government's industrial development methods as a
strategy for Tunisia and its people and to see it
in that context rather than evaluating it from an
American perspective. By examining the strategy
and the policies for implementing it, we can see
that the Tunisian government has chosen a useful
path for its nation's industrial development, hut
that some of the long--term consequences of this
approach might potentially overshadow the immediately apparent benefits.
In order to assess the validity of the g-overnment's approach to industrial development, this
paper will first look briefly at Tunisia to provide
some background. Then, the foundations of the
Tunisian strategy will be discussed by examining
outward-looking- growth policies, the exploitative
development approach, and especially the phenomenon of off-shore production.
The industrialization process itself will be discussed in order
to determine why countries actively seek it, some
of its limitations, and some of its consequences.
The paper will next turn to the role of the
Tunisian government in promoting industrial
development, looking at the different laws, plans,
and agencies that the government has used to
build Tunisia's industrial sector.
The Tunisian
economy will then be examined in the arens of
employment, existing industry, and investment,
with special emphasis given to off-shore in<lustries. Finally, some of the pros and cons of this
combination--outward-looking growth policies, the
exploitative approach, and off-shore production-as an industrial development strRtegy will be
examined.
Industry, as the term is used in this pRper,
refers to manufacturing as in the production of
goods by hand or by machine from rRw materials
at any stage of the process' rather than to heavy
industry, like steel production.
This study
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assumes that Tunisia uses as its ultimate goal a
Western model of industrial development.
It
exi:imines the government's role in encouraging
industrial development, emphasizing that aspect of
the government's role aimed at attracting foreign
participation in the Tunisian economy. While all
aspects of government policy in this regard will
be examined, special attention will be given to the
phenomenon of off-shore production.
This phenomenon is emphasized because much of the
foreign investment in Tunisia can be described as
off-shore production.
This choice has been a
deliberate one on the part of the government, :md
as such, many of the remarks made about
Tunisian industry have special reference to that
particular phenomenon.
Background
The country of Tunisia lies between Algeria
and Libya in North Africa.
7,202, 000 people
1
populate its 164 ,206 kilometers.
The population
is evenly divided between men and women.
In
1980 the population of 6,369,000 was divide~
between 3, 204, 100 men and 3, 164, 900 women.
Approximately two-thirds of its population is
under thirty years of age. Since independence in
1956, Tunisia hfls worked hard to modernize and
become relatively self-sufficient.
This has included developing flgricultural areas as well as
urban areas.
L_ike many Third World countries, Tunisia
has the problem of having more people than it can
employ. Some of its labor force works outside of
the country (200, 000 in Europe with more scattered t~roughout the Middle East, particularly in
Libya),
their earnings providing a valuable
source of foreign exchange.
In addition, the
government has promoted an aggressive industrial
development program. As a French protectorate,
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TunisiRn manufacturing was dominated by French
companies. After independence, the French left,
and some of the firms were nationalized.
The
French left Tunisia with a "well-advanced economic infrastructure" that now includes railroads
connecting port cities and most major cities, roRds
"providing easy access to all cities and villages,"
six se1-1ports, an "adequate supply of electricity
for the major cities," and a modern telephone
4
system.
Although caught up in the national
cooperative movement of the 1960s, Tunisian
industrial policy in the 1970s has focused on
encouraging private investment to develop ~m
industrial sector that is fabor-intensive and
export-oriented.
Since independence, "industry
has made the sharpest growth of al1 economic
sectors," with m~nufacturing undergoing the
greatest exp:rnsion.
Outward-Looking Growth Policies
Countries wanting to attract foreign investment g1;11erally feature outward-looking growth
policies.
The elements of such a policy include
a liberal trade policy and payments regime, an
unfixed exchange rate system, fiscal incentives to
export production, and tight domestic monetary
and fiscal policies.
For these elements to take
effect and make :rn outward-looking growth policy
successful, a country needs to have "i. a disciplined, educated and skilled urban labour force,
ii. an active and efficient entrep~neurial cl;:iss,
and iii. a stable political system."
TunisiR possesses the first and third elements.
The Exploitative Approach
Richard Cooper describes the exploitative
approach as using legal (under GATT--the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) border fax
adjustments to improve a country's trRde ~ositiori
and to avoid exchange rate adjustments.
Some
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examples of this approach are flags of convenience on shipping, light re~stration and disclosure requirements on securities, tax havens,
subsidies to foreign investment, and fax concessions. These last two are this paper's primary
concerns. The exploitative approach "attempts to
take advantag-e of the growing interdependence in
ways which are successful if pursued by only a
9
Herein lies the heart of the
few countries."
problem with the exploitative approach which
prevents its hRving usefulness as a more general
development approach. Small countries are really
the only ones who are in a "favorable position to
exploit international rules ~ the increased
mobility of firms :rnd funds."
Countries with
larger economies engaging in similar behRvior,
granting subsidies to foreign investment, for
example, would disrupt the international economy
too much, if only because its peers would see
such behavior as unfair and possibly retaliate.
At the same time, this approach works only if a
few small countries utilize it. Too many following
the same policies defeat the purpose of the special
incentives to attract foreign industries. The
approach then works for no one.
Off-Shore Production
Both of these ideas come together in a
phenomenon
known
as off-shore production.
Off-shore production involves an industry that
"imports a substantial proportion of its semifinished imports and exports the bulk of its
output.. The supply of technol~'r' and design by
the ultimate user is frequent."
The off-shore
plant is generally used for one particular phase
in the production process, such as sewing jackets
together.
Generally such plants are located in
"countries with a compaJ.12tive adv::mtage in
labour-intensive activities."
Imports of this
nature accounted for 25 percent of manufactured
imports from developing countries in 1977. (This

6
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figure includes only items covered under certain
tariff provisions.
Imports outside these provisions, licensing agreements, and m:rnag-ement or
marketing- contraq'tf with independent firms are
not represented.)
Off-shore production is based on the concepts of comparative advantage and internationalization of production processes.
The doctrine of comparative advantage states that "a
country will gain by specializing- in the production
of those commodities in which its comparRtive
advantage is greatest, exporting these i:;oods in
exchange for ones 1,fhere its comparative cost
1
advantage is less."
The "commodity" which
most Third World countries h:we the greatest
comparative Rd vantage in is low-cost labor. As a
result, the main industries that have est::lblished
off-shore plants in Third World countries have
been labor-intensive ones like textiles and
electronics.
These industries help Rhsorb the
country's unemployed. In addition, countries like
Tunisia offer the advantages of proximity to major
markets (Europe, AfricR, and the Middle East),
the existence of basic infrastructure, and relative
political stability.
Off-shore production activities have become a
"dynnmic factor in fS1dustrial development" in
developing countries.
Governments have encouraged this. (This will be discussed in depth
later.)
The
Organization
for
Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that
these
off-shore
processing
zones
th Rt
the
governments encourage have "been incr&asingly
integrated into the domestic economy."
This
indicates that the policy of attracting off-shore
industries can have more long-term economic
benefits for a country other than its initinl
"exploitative" value.
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In terms of a labor force, industrial activities require workers and operatives; clerical,
Administrative and executive officers; and entrepreneurs.
In the case of off-shore production
enterprises, the host country provides the first
three types of workers and sometimes a few
Administrative officers, while foreigners serve as
exec.u~ivI officers.
This tendency holds true for
7
Tumsia.
Statistics on two industrial countries, West
Germany and the United States, show that the
phenomenon is growing. Over the past decade, a
substantiAl increase has occurred in the imports
entering these two countries under specfal tariff
prov1s1ons on off-shore processing.
In 1962,
West Germany imported 386 million deutsche marks
worth of goods under these provisions. In 1976,
this figure rose to 216 billion deutsche marks. In
1966, U.S. imports under these provisions totaled
$61 mil~on.
In 1976, they increased to $2 .8
billion.
Industrialization
The phenomenon of industrialization itself
requires examination.
Why will countries adopt
methods like attracting off-shore plants to gain an
industrial foundation for itself?
What benefits
does it see itself accruing as
a result of
industrialization? The reasons are numerous And
varied.
Benefits of Industrialization
Keith McLachlan observes in "Development
Strategy--The Need to Industrialize?" that "the
need for rapid industrial growth in the area tends
to increase in direct proportion to size of population f91d/or lack of exportable primary commodities."
The size of population and the need to
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employ that population are major reasons behind
industrialization in the Third World.
Industrialization promotes general economic growth and
infuses more efficiency into the whole economy.
Developing countries see industrialization as a
means of raising their citizens' standard of living.
Additionally, industrialization allows the st::ibilization of national income through production
diversification.
It also improves a country's
balance of payments position through the ·product's exportation.
l\fanufacturing processes are generally more
flexible in terms of methods and output than is
agriculture. Industrial production is less susceptible to fluctuations from uncontrollable circumstances, like rainfall, than agricultural production. Control can be exercised over production ,
and supply can be correlated to dem1md . Faster
20
growth rates are possible in industry.
The
g-reater degree of control, the introduction of new
processes and technology,
and the greater
flexibility make this increase in productivity
possible. Factories also deal with operRting costs
which :ire more controllable than fixed costs.
Industrialization introduces modern technolog·y
into the general economy as well as into the
specific industry. The country also gains Recess
to foreign technology and expertise RS well as
foreign capital.
The benefits of industrialization extend
beyond
eRsily
measured
economic
benefits.
Industrialization builds natiom1l prestige.
It
brings Third World countries closer to the level
of the advanced industrial countries, serving as a
sign that a country has become modern. Levels
of education, skills, and life styles generally rise
as a result of industrializ::1tion. It also serves as
a viable method of changing attit~pes toward
development and changing life styles.
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Nations also have more overtly political
rensons for desiring industrialization.
Some
leaders see industrialization as necessary for
political sovereignty. Industrialization provides a
domestic base to service a national military machine. It also is necessary for economic sovereignty by making them less economically dependent on First World nations. The industrial base
and the economic growth that industrialization
provides can also help place Third World countries in a better bargaining position in international financial negotiations.
These at least are the hopes that industriRlization inspires. An alternative perspective on
the employment questions demonstrates that these
hopes are not always realized.
Ghazi Duwaji
points out that "the significance of this objective
[industry's employment potential] may be easily
exaggerated because of the relatively small nu~2
bers required to operate a modern factory."
Keith McLachlan airs a broader doubt when he
observes that "the educated for the most part
acknowledge that domestic industrialization has
the effect of making the Middle East states more
rather ?Shan less reliant on the advanced countries."""
Industrialization is not the cure-all its
supporters claim.
Considerations in Industrialization
A
statement
found
in
"Development
Strategy--The Need to Industrialize?" exemplifies
the attitude of many Third World leaders
regarding industrial development.
"Once the
deadening hand of the outside powers is remove<l
and once the local economies have ample technical
and
manag-erfal
cadres
available,
then
industrialization ~ay proceed on a more or less
2
steady course."
The problem is how does a
country develop the necessary technical and
managerial c11dres without assistance from "the
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deadening hand," and once it has, how does the
country remove "the deadening hand" without
disrupting its economy?
A desire for industrialization is not sufficient
to bring it about.
There Are constraints on
industrial development, certain requirements that
must be met. Simply having hordes of people is
not enough to make them employable in a factory.
Industrial work requires certain skills, arid it is
not necessArily always economically worth training
a population to do the ~k.
(Tunisia, with a
literacy rate of 62 percent
is considered to have
a fairly well-skilled and educated work force.)
Besides, training cannot always compensate for
experience.
Capital is another requirement often in short
supply in Third World nations. The construction
and outfitting of the factory require capital.
Capital is needed to obtain the materials to initially produce goods. . Lack of capital in developing
countries is a partfal explanation for Third World
willingness to engage in off-shore production
enterprises.
In some countries, there are also
problems of inadequate energy sources and resources needed for some production processes.
Another concern is that wag~ rates do rise over
time and as countries develop, thus eroding- one
of the m::iin advantages
Third World countries
to First World industries.

%

The existence of an adequate infrastructure
is also a determinant in a country's ability to
support industrial development.
This includes
considerations like utilities and services (w::iste
disposal
for
example)
and
transportation-railroads, roads, and ports.
Modern factories
require this infr::istructure to operate, but it is
expensive to develop and maintain.
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Another consideration is the need to differentiAte between the needs of small states and the
needs of larg-e states. Small states do not offer
the size and breadth of markets that large countries do, so almost all industries will hi:ive to
produce for export to differing degrees.
Effects of Industrializi:ition
The actual effects of industrialization for any
given country are hard to predetermine, but
there are some that have previously proved
themselves as likely consequences.
Industrialization has been shown to raise the marriage
age, particularly for girls.
The availability of
employment allows young people the opportunity
to contribute to, rather than drain, family finances.
Postponing children's marriages is no
longer an economic hardship.
Raising- the marriage age affects population growth, a significant
factor in developing- countries, by cutting into
the reproductive years of women.
Another
effect
of
industrialization
is
urbanization. Factories tend to locate near large,
developed population centers, which in turn cause
these centers to attract more people from the
rural areas.
Urbanization has its own set of
benefits and disadvantages.
Not all consequences are necessarily positive. Keith McLachlan notes that industrialization
c:rn lead to the "creation of u2rredictable political
forces - of uncertain loyalty."
He goes on to
point out that industrialization, particularly the
off-shore variety, can also result in "a deepening
relfance on foreign suppliers of technology and
foreign gnarkets, not without its political implica2
tions."
McLachlan sees another major problem
with development of industrial capacities, raising
questions about the ultimate benefits of industrial
strategies that depend on outside economies. I-!e
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observes that ''rapid and effective crei:ition of
industry
is
feasible.
Sus2wning·
progress,
however, may be difficult." •
This is the
question that all Third World countries eng-Rg'ed in
pr::ictices like off-shore production must ask
themselves. Solutions are hard to give since the
newly industrializing countries really h::ive not
been in operation long enough to provide
empirical data.
Government Policy
Industrial development in Third World countries seems to require government intervention.
This is especially true when the country utilizes a
development strntegy based on foreign investment. The Tunisian government has been especially active in this area.
Some of the mRjor
policies are reviewed below.
The main goals of the Tunisian g:overnment
in promoting industrial development have been to
boost manufactured expoi:ts and to create employment. Dimitri Germidis states that Tunisia likes
to "compare herself to Singapore or Hong Kong,
endeavoring to attract foreign investment on
account of its abundi:ince of low-priced m:rnpower . . . and its [Tunisia's 5ctive work force]
high level of qualification." 3
The government
plans aim to obtain the capital necessary to raise
industrial investment and to increase the productivity of existing enterprises.
The government
has engaged in a certain amount of import restriction
and
protectionism
to
encourRge
indigenous industries, but has placed most emphasis on encouraging foreign companies to establish factories in Tunisia.
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Incentives
The government has offered a variety of
incentives to companies willing to locate in the
country.
In g·ener::il, these include acceler::ited
deprecifi.tion of plants and machinery, duty-free
entry of capital goods, and tax concessions for
large investments.
The government has also
adjusted internal freight rates, provided low
interest rates on loans and subsidies, and granted companies preferential treatment by government order departments.
New investments do require advance permission from the Minister of Planning and Economics
"to regulate the industrial development in the
country as well as to maintain h::irmony within the
indu~ty'ial sector vis-1l-vis the rest of the economy."
The Investment Code divides investments
into three categories:
Category A, for investments under $95, 000; Category B, for investments
between $95,000 and $475,000, with at least 10
employees; and Category C, for investments over
$475,000, with at least 50 employees. Category A
investors
receive
reductions
in
faxes.
Category B offers three fax-free years with a
five-year extension available.
The government
guarantees facilitory inventory fin::incing, loans,
and tax- and duty-free importation of equipment.
The conditions are the same for Category C
except th11t these investors receive five tax-fr3z
years with a possible five-year extension.
Individu::il companies can negotiate separately with
the government for a more favorable depreciation
schedule, a guaranteed level of taxation for up to
twenty ye::irs, free land for construction, government-provided site preparation, ::i limited-time
monopoly position, and protection from imports.
The availability of these additional advantages
depends on the development priority of that
particular industry, its location, the number of
employees,
the amount of foreign exchange
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imported, the v::ilue added in the manufacturing
process, and the percentage of products exported.
In addition, foreign investors specifically
receive the guaranteed transfer of invested
capital and profits after justifying the transfer to
the central bank.
Tunisia has negotiated private investment
guarantee treaties with the governments _of the
United
States,
Switzerland,
West
Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. Tunisia
was the first country to sign the World Bank
International Investment Arbitration AgreemP.nt,
which specifies CQf3pensation procedures in case
of nationalization.
The government has also
established a national investment society so "individuals would have a chance to invest in an
institution which would ::iccelerate the industrialization of the country and thr.feby raise the
standard of living of the people."
Laws
Since gaining independence, Tunisia has
pAssed many laws concerning foreign investment ,
particularly concerning investment in industry.
Most of the laws apply to enterprises that export
at least 20 percent of their production. Tunisia
began in 1957, immediately after independence,
with the Guarantee Fund for Foreign Investment.
This allowed investors placing foreign currency in
the fund to transfer the profits RS well RS the
original investment bRck out of the country.
Capital placed in the fund was invested in new
enterprises
or
improvements
to
existing
enterprises. The tr:rnsfer was subject to certain
conditions such as a two-yeRr waiting period and
the enterprise's designation by the government AS
a "productive" enterprise.
A law passed on
February 10, 1958, guarirnteed investors stRble
tax rates for at least fifteen years with five-ye ::i r
extensions possible. Provisions of the fund h Rve
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been · modified by subsequent laws and policies,
such as the investment code discussed previously.
In arldition, Letters of Guarantee ~rnd Letters
of Establishment were instituted.
(Letters of
Establishment were actually begun in the late
1940s under the French.) Letters of Guarantee
allow firms to obtain medium- and long-term credit
for investment and to qualify for state loan
guarantees. Letters of Establishment are granted
to any industrial enterprise "whose creation or
extension is of inwest to the economic development of Tunisia."
These Letters allow for a
five-year tax exemption with a five-year extension
available if profits are reinvested in the enterprise. The Letters also grant cRrry-over for five
years of deficit balances from the first five
years.
This provision is for tax purposes.
Income from stocks and shares due for loans
establishing or extending an industry is tax free.
With this Letter, taxes levied on the following can
be deducted: 1) raw materials or other materials
for manufacturing new products; 2) materials,
products, or objects not a finished product which
are destroyed or lose special qualities in the
manufacturing process; and 3) containers and
packag-es for delivery.
Finally, firms holdingLetters of Establishment Rre exempt from taxes
and duties on imported agricultural, industrial,
and commercial equipment.
More recent laws passed to promote industrial d~velopment are Law 72-38 and the 1981
investment law.
Law 72-38 (April 27, 1972)
provides tax incentives for industrial enterprises
operating solely for export.
These include
20-year tax holidays from customs duties and
turnover taxes and a ten-year exemption from
corporate taxes; taxes for the second ten years
are limited to one-tenth the normal rate. Those
industries are also "exonerated from taxes on the
turnover for purchases in the domestic market for
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products necessary for manufacturing. 1136 They
Are reimbursed for ''fees and taxes to local concessionaires, sellers of outfitting ~ds or products bought by the enterprises."
The bRsic
g-oal of this law is to "establish conditions Adequate for the establishment and the taking- $1-dvan3
tage of enterprises producing for export."
Law 81-56 (June 23, 1981) is t~g most _liberal
of all Tunisia's investment laws. '
This law
provides incentives for industries that locate in
underdeveloped regions, that engage in high-tech
manufacturing, and that Rre oriented towards
export.
This law provides for customs exemptions on imports and reduced taxation of
profits dependent on the number of employees.
In addition, the government assumes the cost of
infrastructure development for industries locating
in specially designated underdeveloped regions.
Government Plans
Industrial policy, like agricultural policy, is
subject to government planning. These plans Are
important only in that they give some sense of
the direction the government sees for industrfal
development. The plans tend to be broad statements which are more important for the policies
and programs that they initiate than for the
results they produce.
The Three Year Plan of 1962..,.64 had as its
goal "industrialization which is adapted to the
needs of the national economy, which is somewhat
more evenly distributed throughout the territory
and which interact~ harmoniously with other
economic activities." 0
The Ten Year Plan of
1962-71 established priorities regarding· industry
and set criteria for selecting industrial projects.
Industrial project selection was to emphasize
"investments involving a m1mmum amount of
capital per worker to be employed and industries
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exposed to the least competition from forehrn
41
industries."
Additional objectives were increasing industry's share in the GNP from the then
current 21 percent to 28 percent, developing
heavy industry, and reducing imbalances between
the different regions.
To achieve these goals,
the Plan proposed increAsing the state's role in
industrial
development
and
developing
an
industrial infrastructure.
During this time,
investment in industry on the government's pa4z
accounted for 15. 6 percent of the total spent.
The Three Year Plan of 1965-68 again set goi:ils
for investment in industry 1.1" this time at 150
million dinars ($300 million). " The Second Ten
Year Plan extended from 1972 to 1981 and looked
for increased investment from the level at that
time of 27 percent to 33 percent. The Five Year
Plan for 1982-86 set f!S its priorities employment,
decentralization,
and
balance
of
payment
equilibrium.
It looks for investment of $146
billion, 40 percent of which is to come from
overseas. Other goals include building- factories
in the interior and raising the minimum wage.
Agencies
To help encoura gP- Western companies to
locate in Tunisia , the government has established
the Agence de Promotion des Investissements
(API).
This agency promotes Tunisia's advantages abroad with offices in the United States,
West
Germany,
France,
Belgium ,
and
the
Netherlands .
In addition to making companies
aw a re of Tunisia's advantages, the API helps the
companies deal with the Tunisian bureaucracy.
Between January and June 1978, the API obtained
413 new projects for Tunisia under Law 74-74
(which assists companies producing- primarily for
the domestic market) and 37 under Law 72-38.
These new projects resulted in a total of 15, 694
new jobs and 98 rIJi,!lion dinars ($196 million)
worth of . investment.
However, by the fall of
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1979, no major international corporation had
established a plant in Tunisia.
Examples of
jndustrial arrangements made include deals with
La Societe des Foyes de La Lorrie to manufacture
tools for export anct with a Germfln firm to produce frui.b juices and vitamins (firm unm1med in
source).
Connected with the API is the Industrial Land Agency which acquires industrial land
sites and sells or rents them at subsidized prices.

The Tunisian Economy
Employment
A main reason Tunisia encourages foreign
companies to locate in the country is to provide
employment. As M. Chedli Ayari, former Minister
of the National Economy, said, "We have thought
the raw material that we can produce i,r not wool
or cotton but manpower and wages." 6 Unemploym.rrt is currently estimated at 15-25 percent. '
The potenti::il for problems th Rt thiE
unemployment rate, especially combined with such
a young population, creates is not lost on
Tunisian leaders.
Tayeb Baccouch, Secretary
General of the Union Generale Tunisienne du
Travail (UGTT) stated in 1982, "Government must
find a solution to unemployment because many of
those without jobs are young, educRted, and
politically active.
4~ it doesn't,
there will be
great social unrest."
Tunisia offers certain advantages in terms of
its labor force. Chief among these is abundanc~
9
The total available work force is 1. 9 million.
The work force is available for a low price relative to Europe and the United States.
The
minimum indus$Qial wage in 1976 was 1. 7 francs an
hour ($1. 25).
Finally, its work force is also
considered to be fairly skilled.
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Government policy from the beginning has
emphasized full employment.
Each of the Ten
Year Pfans has held that as a goal. The First
Ten Year Plan (1962-71) saw industry providing
20 percent of that employment.
To reach this
goal "the solution advanced by the government is
to encourage foreign investors to set up business
in Tunisia and thereby mop up the dangerous
pools of the unemployed:
as Tyani Chelli, the
head of the API puts it, 'Our main pre-occu~tion
is to import work rather than export labor."'
Tunisian law requires that employees be over
sixteen years of age, but this is not always
enforced-.
Most of the employees engRged by
foreign enterprises are women. They work under
"safety and health hazards that would provg~e
any Western union to call an immediate strike."
Manufacturing is the nation's number two
employer, employing 16. 5 ~3rcent of the total
active work force in 1981.
153, 800 men, or
approximately 30 percent of the male active work
force, and 146, 100 women, or approximately 40
percent of the female active work force are
employed in manufacturing. This is 351 increase
4
of approximately 50 percent over 1976.
Of the
m1rnufacturing industries located in Tunisia, the
major employers are as follows: wearing apparel,
employing 16, 277 people; food products with
12 ,566 employees; non-metal products with 12 ,637
employees; and textiles, spinning, and weaving
with 9 ,630 employees each (ave:g~ge number of
employees based on 1977 figures).
The minimum industrial wage was instituted
in 1977 after a series of labor strikes.
It is
adjusted if the cost of living index goes up more
than 5 percent and remains at that · level for six
consecutive months.
The highest wages were
received in the non-metal products industry,
which in 1977 paid 15,552 dinars ($31,104.00);
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the industrial chemical industry, where workers
received 13,066 dinars ($26,132.00); and the food
products industry, which paid 12 ,451 dinars
($24, 902. 00).
Of the largest employers, the
wearing apparel industry paid 11, 222 dinars
($22, 444. 00), and the textile jndustry and the
spinning and weaving industry paid 9, 419 dinars
(total
givesh in
thousands
of
dinars
or
$18,838.00).
These last three industries are
ones likely to be off-shore plants for Western
57
industries.
Industries and Investment
Most industries located in Tunisia are in
Tunis and along the coastline south to Sfax. As
previously noted, manufacturing- has been one of
the fastest growing sectors of the economy. The
contribution of m~S1ufacturing- to the GDP was 13
percent in 1974.
(Industry g§ a whole contributed 24 percent of the GDP.)
Under the First Ten Year Plan, investment
in the beverage and foodstuff industry was
$24, 240, 000,
and inves~went in
the
textile
industry was $38,160,000.
In 1978, 164,900,000
dinars
($329.8
million)
were
invested
in
manufacturing
industries,
accountingfor
approximately 25 percent of thUl total investment
in the country for that year.
Investment is
oriented toward sectors requiring manpower and
sectors based on exportRtion. Private investment
dominates, in acco16~ance with the government's
previous intentions.
Foreign investment has accounted for 69. 2
percent of total investment in the Tunisian ·economy.
Mixed projects (between Tunisians and
foreign partners) accounted for 22.8 percent. Of
this foreign investment, West Germnny accounted
for 56. 6 percent, the Netherlands for 9. 3 percent, Switzerland for 1. 6 percent, France for 1. 3
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percent, find Belgium for 0.4 percent.
Among
the mixed projects, 7. 8 percent were with Dutch
partners, 6. 4 percent with French partners, 3. 8
percent with Italian and German partners, 2. 7
percent with German d3artners, and 2 .1 percent
with British partners.
In 1973, of the projects
begun in Tunisia, 22. 8 percent were foreign and
53.6 percent were mixed. The breakdown on the
foreign projects is as follows: Textile Alliance of
Hong Kong, 50 percent; West Germany, 27.4
percent; the Netherlands, 18.8 percent; France
2. 2 percent; and Italy, 1. 7 percent.
Of the
mixed projects, Italy ::iccounted for 83. 6 percent,
France for 9. 4 percent, West Germany for 3
6
percent, and the Netherlands for 3. 3 percent.
In the 1973-74 period, . 84 percent of the investments were in the textile ~~dustry, providing- 41
percent of the employment.

4

Assessment of Off-Shore Production
as a Means of Development
On the basis of the figures presented in the
preceding section, it would seem that, as stated
in Tunisia: A Country Study, "Tunisia has succeeded in attracting foreign i16~estment in labourintensive, export industries."
Two major goals
of the government have been accomplished.
Looked at merely on this level, the government's
method of building its economy on a foreign
foundation seems successful.
The subsequent
discussion will examine some of the pros and cons
of this method.
Adv:rntages
Off-shore production provides employment
and the accompanying salaries to people who
otherwise would not have either.
The salaries
are small by Western standards.
Some textile
workers receive one and one-half dinars a day
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($3), which works out to $105g per year, well
7
below the official minimum wage.
The argument
could be made that any safary would be better
than nothing, especially in a nation without the
social welfare programs found in most industrialized countries.
Additionally, much of the money goes to
individuals who previously made no economic
contribution to the household, such as women and
teenagers.
Economically then , the people gAin.
The government gains by being- ;:ible to tax the
people's incomes and not having to provide economic relief for them.
Some of those employed
are also able to acquire useful skills, providing
long-term benefits for their country.
This
advantage only applies, however, for the few that
are placed in supervisory positions or positions
requiring· special training.
Work is ~Y acknowledged way of effecting
social change.
It takes people outside their
family groups and makes them think on n more
individual basis. Work places their welfare in the
hands of the general society and economy rather
than the family. Loosening traditional family ties
is another important factor in implementing change
(although there are also disadvantages associated
with supplanting this family support system).
These attitudinal ch~mges are important for a
government wanting to replace traditional values
and practices with more modern (i.e. , Western)
values and practices.
Governments see these
attitudinal changes as being important and necessary in order to become a modern economy on par
with established industrial powers.
This attitudinal ch:rnge can particularly hP.
seen when women work. Generally the phenomenon of women working leads to freer conduct for
women and helps develop a more tolerant attitude
toward change. Lorna Hawker Durrani points out
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"that women gain, through working, a new realiwtion of their own ability to support themselves. . . . They must necessarily fe~g freer as
a result of this possible independence."
In addition, working also frees women and
society in another way.
It has the effect of
raising the marriage age (the legal minimum in
Tunisia is seventeen for women and twenty for
men) because the girl, especially, no longer has
to be an economic burden on her family. She can
contribute to the family income (as can a boy)
and earn money for her dowry.
Raising the
marriage
age
in
turn
helps
reduce
the
reproductive
years
of
a
woman.
Slowing
population growth is a necessary goal for most
Third World countries who already find it difficult
to support their present populations.
This in
turn
will eventually help the unemployment
problem.
Without the foreign companies, these
girls would be unlikely to find employment in
Tunisia.
An additional advantage to off-shore production and related methods is that it results in the
development of an infrnstructure as well as the
actual manufacturing structures.
The infrastructure is important for any subsequent development, for attracting new industries, and for
tourism. The facilities can also be used for other
purposes when they are no longer used by the
original company. They c::in then become a basis
for the development of indigenous industries.
Disadvantages
Probably the grentest disadvantage associated with the outward-looking growth/exploitative/
off-shore production approach is the question of
sustainability.
This approach is based primarily
on low-labor costs.
These cannot last forever.
In fact, wages were increased 22 percent in 1981
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70
and 30 percent in 1982.
The current Five Ye;H
Plan also calls for additional wage increases.
Eventually, these industries will move to other
countries where labor is cheaper.
Tunisian
owners could take over the operation, perhaps
producing for the domestic market. If they want
to produce for export (which, given the size of
the Tunisian market, they would almost have to
do), however, they will face the problems of
access to the raw materials and the need for a
sales and distribution network as well as the
problem
that
their
products
will
not
be
competitive
(unless
subsidized)
with
similar
products produced in countri.es with lower wages.
What then happens to the people formerly
employed?
How do they and the government
compensate for their loss of salary?

Another side of the unemployment picture is
the fact that women are the on~ predominantly
employed in off-shore industries.
This occurs
at the loss of jobs to men. (In 1981, with ov73
83, 000 unemployed, over 70, 000 were men.)
This situation creates social distress because it
upsets traditional roles within the family as well
as within society.
This in turn leads to poor
attitudes toward women working ff d the chang-es
that accompany that phenomenon .
. In terms of employment, questions can also
be asked about the working conditions of those
employed in off-shore plants, which as previously
mentioned are dismal.
The people seem to feel
the salary is worth the conditions. However, Rs
we in the West are well aware, poor work conditions can h:we dire, long-term consequences for
the health of employees.
One can also ask whether the government
does not give away more than it gains with its
incentive pnckage.
With the various incentives
offered, it is hard to see how companies opening·
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an off-shore plant are liable for any taxation.
The only obvious form of government revenue is
through fees for work permits. Additionally, the
government must employ customs inspectors to
oversee the entry and departure (or destruction)
of all goods used in the production processes to
insure that they meet the requirements for dutyfree entry. As Dimitri Germidis states, "Tunisia
functi?fSS, for these enterprises, as a vast free
zone."
In some cases, the government must
also sustain the cost of development of the
infrastructure.
A political disadvantage of this approach to
industrialization is having a foreign presence in
the country and having the national economy tied
to its operation, even if in a minor way. Such a
situation is always a sensitive issue in recently
independent countries, particularly if the foreign
presence is that of a former coloniRl or neoimperialist power.
The government loses some
control over the national economy. Even if the
national economy were totally "Tunisian," the
decisions and policies of the major industrial
powers would still affect it.
Summary and Conclusion
Looking at the outward-looking growth/exploitative/off-shore production approach in terms of
the goals expressed by the Tunisian government,
it would seem to be a short-term solution to
Tunisia's problems with long-term potential for
harm irnd good. Both of the government's goals
in
choosing
this
approach
have
heen
accomplished.
The
approach
has
attracted
labor-intensive,
export-oriented industries
to
Tunisia. The approach's long-term potential for
growth can be seen in the Asian countries that
Tunisia likes to compare itself with (Hong Kong
1rnd Singapore). Its use in the more traditional
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Third World countries of Africa and Latin America
is too recent to adequately evalw~te, although
some countries Associated with it, such as Brazil,
are
currently
having
economic
difficulties.
Tunisia too is having difficulties in the economically strained 1980s. Perhaps one of the limitations of this mixed development approach is thflt
it requires a strong world economy.
Another
limitation is that it only works on a small level,
and perhaps there
are
already too many
practitioners
(for
while
Tunisia
has
been
apparently successful, its unemployment figures
disguise the fact that it still exports numerous
workers to other Middle Eastern and European
countries).
Most of the Arguments agAinst off-shore
production as a short-term strategy 11re primarily
intangible, ethical questions, or hard-to-measure
economic losses (in the form of tax revenues
foregone, for example). Many of these objections
hnve responses that are often just as difficult to
measure.
In general though, the benefits of
Tunisia's combination strategy are more concrete
And quantitatively measurable.
The salaries ,
experience, and facilities provided help the people
now and also offer a foundation for the later
development of indigenous industries. The more
intangible benefit of attitudirn~l change is also
important for the country's future development
since changing people's attitudes is generally the
most difficult part of development.
Looking at
the government's goals, which have been Achieved
(although maybe not to the extent thRt the government would like) in using the off-shore
production approach to developing the country's
industry, Tunisia's leaders appear to have found
a development path capable of t::iking their
country from a traditional, agricultural orientRtion
into the modern industrial world. Whether or not
this approach prepares them adequately to cope
with the problems that will accomp:rny this
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transition, however, gives cause for hesitation in
totally supporting off-shore production as a me:rns
of development.
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NUCLEAR PERPLEXITY
Mark Field *
On Monday, July 16, 1945, the first atomic
homb was detonated at the Trinity test site near
Alamogordo,
New Mexico.
Since that time,
mankind has lived under the dark cloud of
nuclear weaponry.
Each year, the quantity of
weapons has multiplied until now there are more
than fifty thousand warheads jointly possessed by
nations of the earth. Although these bombs were
built as weapons for war, their significance
extends beyon~ war and all its various causes
and outcomes.
If nuclear weapons are ever
used, even on a moderate scale, the extent of
destruction would be so far-reaching, and its
effects on the earth's ecosystem so severe, that
the extinction of mankind would be imminent. In
the words of Jonathan Schell, these weapons
"grew out of history, yet they threaten to end
history.
They were made by men, yet they
threaten to annihilate man. They are a pit into
which the whole world can fall--a ne~esis of all
human intentions, actions, and hopes."
It is the
risk of complete annihilation, which has arisen
from man's ability to avail himself of nature's
ultimate destructive forces, that causes us to
suspend our judgment concerning the possibility
of a victor in · a nuclear war.
Nevertheless,
although it is certainly the case that the actual
use of nuclear weapons could never be (morally)
condoned, there are many who claim that the very
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existence of these weapons significantly reduces
the probability that a conflict could arise of sufficient magnitude that it would ultimately lead to
nuclear war.
It is their conclusion that the
mutual capabilities of both sides to completely
destroy each other not only serve to limit encroachment and the advancement of counterideologies, they also serve to deter the use of
nuclear weapons. Indeed, since the threat to use
such weapons does not require their u-se and
since these threats may prevent great evils,
deterrence of unacceptable behavior on the p::irt
of foreign powers via the threat of nuclea,r destruction
may
be
morally
permissible.
In
discussing nuclear deterrence and some of its
moral implications, the aim of this paper will be to
(a) make an inquiry into the moral permissibility
or impermissibility of nuclep,r deterrence as a
means of national defense;
(b) describe
a
(hypothetical) situation which represents (at least
prima facie) a perplexing moral state of affairs
involving the conclusions arrived at from the
above discussion of nuclear deterrence; and
(c) attempt to provide an elplanation that will
free us from this perplexity.
To this end, we
must
begin
by
establishingan
acceptable
fundamental moral value which will be able to
adequately guide us through the first pl'lrt of the
argument.
There are, of course, a variety of moral
values that people recog-nize as being fundamental
in their lives.
Among these may be freedom,
love, justice, etc.
However, there must be a
fundamental value which can serve as the
ontological basis for all moral values. Life is that
fundamental value. Without life (i.e., without the
phenomenon of growth aimed at a possibly
successful end), the fact that something is good
or bad does not seem to make sense. It could
5
not be good for or bad for anything.
Values
such as freedom and justice apply to human ·life
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both individually and collectively; and without
life, what meaning could these values have?
Thus, human life should be regarded as the
primary fundamental moral value. The primacy of
this value allows us to attach to it supreme moral
worth.
Our first proposition, then, will be as
follows:
(1)

Human life is of supreme moral worth
(i.e., each instance of human life has
exactly the same value as every other
instance of human life).

If human life has supreme moral worth, then it
follows that it is (a) morally impermissible to take
the lives of others and (b) morally permissible to
protect one's own life. However, it is certainly
conceivable that the protection of one's own life
may require that that person take the life of
another. Thus, if a person is seeking to protect
his own life, then it seems to be morally
permissible to take the life of another person.
But (a) has already told us that it is morally
impermissible to do this. We find, therefore, that
our fundamental value tells us that it both is and
is not morally permissible to take the lives of
others.
This
conclusion,
however,
is
a
contradiction; and it compels us to either reject
(1) or find a solution.
Given the intuitive
correctness of this proposition, we should attempt
to formulate a solution.
Such a solution will
involve two parts. First, any situation in which
a person's life is at stake is a situation involving
aggression and defense. In any such situation,
human life may be either (a) innocent, i.e., not
responsible for aggressive or threatening behavior
or
(b) accountable
(not-innocent),
i.e.,
responsible
for
aggressive
or
threatening·
behavior. This means that a person seeking to
protect his own life may be in a position to either
take the life of an innocent person or a
non-innocent person or both.
Second, it does
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not seem just that a person may take the life of
1rn
individual
who is
not
responsible
for
aggression in order to protect himself. To arrive
at this conclusion, however, we must assume the
logical priority of the moral impermissibility of
taking human life over the moral permissibility of
protecting one's own life. Thus, whereas killing
innocent
human
life
is
absolutely
morally
prohibited,
protectini:;
one's
own
life
is
contingently morally admissible (i.e., contingent
upon the fact that if he must take the life of a
person to protect his own, that person must be
accountable or not innocent).
We may now
continue with our argument and in view of the
foregoing
discussion,
add
the
following
proposition:
(2)

If human life is of supreme worth, then
it
is
both
(a) absolutely
morally
impermissible to take the lives of
innocent
human
beings,
and
(b) contingently morally permissible to
protect one's own life.

Human life, however, is more than simply
biological. There are secondary values which a
person esteems that define him as a human being
(i.e., these values define a person's humanity).
To deprive an individual of these secondary
values is to negate that individual's essential
humanity. 6 Therefore, if human life has supreme
worth and if a person's humanity is defined in
terms of his secondary values, then we may
proceed with our argument as follows:
(3)

. ·. ( 4)

If it is contingently morally permissible

to protect one's own (biological) life,
then it is also contingently morally
permissible to protect those secondary
fundamental values which define one's
humanity .
If human life has supreme worth, then
it is absolutely morally impermissible to

NUCLEAR PERPLEXITY

41

take the life of an innocent person in
order to protect one's own life (either
his biological life or the fundamental
values of his life).
This conclusion seems acceptable enoug-h,
but what about threatening to kill innocent people
as a means of protecting one's own life? There
appears to be a substantial difference between
actually killing an innocent person and merely
threatening to do so.
However, suppose, for
example, that A and B are adversaries and that B
is intent on killing A. In this situation, A will
seek to protect his own life (which we know, by
proposition (2), to be morally permissible). But
suppose that A can only protect himself if he
threatens to kill B's sister, S, who is innocent of
the entire affair.
This threat will undoubtedly
involve the intention to kill S (for if A does not
have this intention, i.e., if he is bluffing, and B
finds this out, then the threat will be f neffective
and A's life will remain in danger).
Is this
intended threat mor::illy permissible? It appears
as
though such
a threat is
not
morally
permissible; and this stance is justified by the
application of the Wrongful Intentions Principle
which states that to intend to do what one knows
8
to be wrong is itself wrong.
There are three
reasons which give this principle plausibility:
( 1) normally, we regard a person who fully
intends to perform a wrongful act and is
prevented from doing so merely by extern::il
circumstances (e.g., a person whose plan to
murder is interrupted by the victim's fatal heart
attack) as being just as bad as the person who
fulfills a similar wrongful act; (b) we view a
person who intends to do what is wrong-, but
then changes his mind, as having set right a
moral failing or error; (c) it is convenient, for a
variety of purposes, to treat a prior intention to
perform a particular act as the origination of the
act ·itself.
Therefore, we are inclined to view
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intentions as components of actions and to ascribe
to each intention th~ moral status ascribed to the
act "containing it."
Accordingly, we can add
the following two propositions:
(5)

. · . ( 6)

The Wrongful Intentions Principle states
that if it is wrong to take the life of an
innocent person, then it is wrong to
intend to take the life of an innocent
person.
_
It is wrong to intend to (i.e. , threaten
with the intention to) take the lives of
innocent
people
as
a
means
of
protecting one's own life.

To this point we have only been addressing
the protection of human life on an individual
level.
However, the notion of protecting one's
own
life
(commonly
called
"self-defense")
resembles situations on a more encompassing
level. For example, there are at least two ways
in which the permissibility of a nation to defend
itself
can
be
derived
from
individual
self-protection.
The first is by means of
composition: the permissibility of national defense
is composed of an authorized government's
exercising, in an organized manner, the combined
permissibility of the self-defense of its individual
citizens. The second is by way of analogy with
the reason being that a nation is similar to R
person in morally relevant respects.
It is,
therefore permissible for a nation to exercise
self-protection like that of a person.
The
significant implication is that just as
the
permissibility of individual self-defense applies to
the preservation of one's biological life and the
fundamental values of thRt life, so also the
permissibility of nation.al sel.f-def~nse appli~s t8
its central values (including its · morality,
independence, sovereignty, and the structure of
its basic institutions) as well as the biological
survival of its members, especially if it -is the
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case, as it seems to be, that the fundamental
values
of
those
members
are
inextricably
connected with the corrinuance of the nation and
its
central
values.
We
shall
conclude,
therefore, that:
(7) National defense is similar to protecting
one's
own
individual
life
(i.e.,
self-defense) .
. ·. (8) If it is morally impermissible to intend
to take the lives of innocent people as a
means of self-defense, then it is morally
impermissible to intend to take the lives
of innocent people as a means of
national defense.
(9) Nuclear deterreffe is a means of
national defense.
(10) However, if nuclear deterrence involves
a threat with the intention to take the
lives of innocent people, then it is
morally impermissible to use nuclear
deterrence as a means of national
defense.
Proposition (10), though, is not as strong as it
might be. That is, it also seems to be the case
that if it is morally impermissible to use nuclear
deterrence as a means of national defense, then
nuclear deterrence must involve a threat with the
intention to take the lives of innocent people.
This would mean that the intention to kill
innocent people is both a necessary and a
sufficient condition for the moral impermissibility
of nuclear deterrence. In spite of this, . nuclear
deterrence may be wrong (if it is, in fact,
wrong) for reasons other than the intention to
kill innocent people. I am not sure what these
other reasons migh1_ be if, in fact, there are
alternative reasons. 3
Nevertheless, we shall
re-state proposition 10 as follows:
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(lO')However, nuclear deterrence is morally
impermissible as a means of national
defense if, and only if, it involves a
threat with the intenti<f~ to take the
lives of innocent people.

Proposition (10') will now allow us to elicit the
the following two-part conclusion:
. · .(11)

On the one hand it is (a) · morally
impermissible to use nuclear deterrence
as a means of national defense when it
involves a threat with the intention to
take the lives of innocent people, while
on the other hand it is (b) mor:=llly
permissible to use nuclear deterrence
when no such intentional threat is
involved.

This concludes the first part of the essay
concerning the moral acceptability of nuclear
deterrence as a form of national defense. In the
second part of this essay, I would like to build
upon this conclusion and attempt to describe a
hypothetical situation which represents (at least
prima facie) a morally perplexing state of affairs.
To begin, I would like to refer back to
proposition ( 3) which states, in part, that it is
contingently morally permissible to protect those
secondary fundamental values which define a
person's humanity.
Among these secondary
fundamental values we should certainly find
autonomy, i.e., the freedom to choose the end in
life that one desires to pursue without the fear
that those ends might be frustrated by the
arbitr~5y
will of others or coercion by the
state.
Thus, autonomy is a kind of freedom;
and there is at least a presumption in favor of
freedom. This presumption rests on the essential
role of freedom concerning the development of
individual traits of intellect and character which
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constitute the good of persons, RS well as its
central importance as a means to the progress of
society. The supreme worth of human life implir~
that eRch human life should realize its fullness.
But in order for an individual to realize a
fullness of life, it is necessary that certain
uniquely
human
powers,
abilities,
and
potentialities be brought to a full development.
This development, however, requires regular and
continual practice at making difficult choices
among 71ternative hypotheses,
policies,
and
1
actions.
The
justification
for
this
was
expressed by John Stuart Mill in his treatise On
Liberty:
The
human
faculties
of
perception,
judgement,
discriminative feeling,
mental
activity, and even moral preference are
exercised only in making a choice. He who
does anything because it is the custom makes
no choice.
He gains no practice either in
discerning or in desiring what is best. The
mental and moral, like the musculV• powers
are improved only by being used.
Thus, if a person conforms to custom merely out
of social pressure and not from deliberative
choice, then he will be led mindlessly along by
the crowd and can have no hope of realizing what
is best in him. Without autonomy, the realization
of human fulfillment does not seem possible.
These are the grounds, then, for espousing a
presumption in favor of freedom.
We can now
continue- our argument:
(12) The supreme worth of human life implies
that each human life should realize its
fullness.
(13) The realization of the fullness of human
life implies the existence of autonomy .
• •• (14) The supreme worth of human life implies
the existence of autonomy.
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( 15) Principles implied by the supreme worl~
of human life have fundamental value .
autonomy
must
have
. '. (16) Individual
fundamental value.
(17) Fundamental
values
should
be
(contingently) protected and promoted
(from proposition (3)) .
. ·• ( 18) It is contingently morally permissible to
protect
and
promote
individual
autonomy.

Suppose, however, that it is contingently morally
permissible to protect and promote a particular
fundamental
value,
V,
but
that
the
only
meaningful way to do this is through a particular
institution I.
If V should be protected and
promoted and I protects and promotes V, then I
should be promoted.
On the other hand, if
subverts V, then I should not be promoted.
This will allow us to expand upon proposition
(18):

20

(19) Institution I should be promoted if and
only if value V should be protected and
promoted and if it is the case that I
protects and promotes V .
. ·. (20) Institutions which protect and promote
individual autonomy should themselves
be promoted whereas institutions which
violate individual autonomy should not
be promoted.
Imagine, now, that the following state of
affairs applies: There is a world (similar to our
own) that is composed of two :rnd only two
polities (nation A and nation B) whose powers
(politically, economically, and militarily) are, for
the most part, equal.
Suppose, also, that the
people of nation A recognize the fundamental
value of individual autonomy and its importance in
achieving a fullness of life.
As R. result, the
primary · goal of nation A is the protection a nd
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promotion of autonomy. The me:rns by which this
goal is accomplished will entail the establishment
of specific legal rules. These laws will prevent
the subversion of autonomy.
However, the
establishment and enforcement of law demands the
existence of a political institution ~pich can
exercise the requisite political power.
Thus,
the protection and promotion of autonomy requires
the existence of a political institution (e.g., a
government).
There
are
any
number
of
governmental institutions that could exercise the
appropriate political power.
However, we shall
suppose that
nation
A creates a political
institution such that the people will be able to
collectively ensure this fundamental value; they
will be able to collectively regulate the decisions
and policies of their authorized leaders to the end
that individual autonomy might be protected.
This collective control of government is achieved
by the establishment of the following three legal
rights: (a) the right of the people (collectively)
to determine who will and will not occupy
positions of leadership within government; (b) the
right of each person to be informed concerning
the opinions, decisions, and policies of their
leaders; and (c) the right of the people
(collectively) to influence the 9Wnions, decisions,
and policies of their leaders.
The people of
nation A will be able to collectively manage their
government, and thereby ensure their autonomy,
if and only if these rights are held inviolate.
Thus, we may add the following two propositions:
(21) The government of nation A is an
institution which protects and promotes
the fundamental value of individual
autonomy .
. ·. (22) The government of nation A should
itself be promoted.
We must now turn to a characterization of nation
B.
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We shall suppose that nation B is a military
polity with a hierarchical military institution
serving as the central government. The primary
goal of the leaders in government is the total
domination of the world. As a means to this end,
the leaders realize that they must possess military
power that is superior to the opposition.
In
order to secure this military superiority, a
central economic plan is formulated that will direct
the natural resources and the efforts- of the
people tow11rds this goal.
However, implicit to
the success of this plan is the imper11tive that
each individual citizen conform to its various
requirements.
If the central strategy is not
followed, then it will fail, and if it fails, then
military superiority will not be attained.
As a
means, therefore, of ensuring the success of the
plan, the military government intervenes and
enforces the conformance of each individual. But
if the government enforces obedience to the
central plan, then it necesW1ly - precludes the
private plans of its citizens.
This means that
if the ends thRt a person chooses to pursue do
not accord with the established program, then the
government intervenes and requires thnt the
private plan be modified so that it will agree with
the central strategy.
However, we mentioned
earlier that individual autonomy is the freedom to
choose the ends in life that one desires to pursue
without the fear that those ends might be
frustrated by the arbitrary will of others or
coercion by the state. Thus, the government of
nation B advances military superiority at the
expense of the individual autonomy. We may now
conclude the following:
government of nation B is an
institution which neither protects nor
fundamental v11lue of
promotes the
individual autonomy.
••• (24) The government of nation B should not
be promoted.
(23) The
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To continue our description, since neither A
nor B are significantly subordinate to each other
in any relevant way, we will assume that each is
an independent and autonomous political society
(although it may be the case that they must
sometimes rely on each other for their own
well-being and continued existence).
Ast) such,
both may be regarded as sovereign nations" 4 with
the rig112 to defend themselves and their
5
interests.
We argued, in fact, for this very
conclusion prior to our statement of proposition
(7). At that point we stated that the right to
national defense is derived from principles of
individual self-defense.
Since an individual has
the right (at least contingently) to protect his
own biological life as well as the fundamental
values
which
define
his
humanity
(from
proposition (3)), and since a sovereign nation
also has central aims, goals and values that are
essential to its existence as well as the biological
lives of its citizens, by analogy we concluded that
a nation has the right to protect itself.
This
conclusion, however, seems to be at odds with
the conclusion arrived at in proposition (24).
Nevertheless, it certainly seems to be the case
that the government of a nation is essential to the
realization of that nation's central aims, goals,
and values; and if this is the case, since these
central values may be protected, then certainly
the
government would also be subject to
protection. There is no contradiction, however,
between the nation's not promoting a particular
government and a (sovereign) nation's right to
protect . its own government.
For example,
consider the following analogy:
As we have
already stated, a government is essential to the
existence
of a
sovereign
nation
and
the
preservation
of its citizens'
way of life.
Similarly, the mind of an individual is essential to
his existence and the preservation of his way of
life. Now it may be the case that this individual
acts
in
ways
that
we
feel
are
morally
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contemptible. Nevertheless, although we may be
justified
in
not
promoting
his
particular
psychological mind-set, we normally do not deny
that he has a right to protect his mind from
destruction.
Analogously,
a
particular
government may engage in actions which we feel
are morally impermissible; but even though we are
justified in not advancing this government, we do
not deny that a nation has the right to protect
what is essential to its existence
even an
iniquitous government. Therefore we can proceed
as follows:
(25) However, all sovereign nations have a
right to self-protection (i.e. , national
defense).
(26) Both nation A and nation B are
sovereign nations .
. ·. (27) Both nation A and nation B have the
right to self-protection (i.e. , national
defense).
Nevertheless,
just as there are moral
limitations on what an individual can do as a
means of self-protection (see proposition (2)), so
also there are limitations on strategies for m1tional
defense which define the parameters outside of
which a particular strategy is considered to be
illegitimate or morally unacceptable.
Given a
world, as we have imagined it, in which two
nations exist with widely divergent ideologies and
points of view concerning the ends and me~rns of
social, political, economic, and military conduct,
conflicts will inevitably arise.
As in our own
world, minor problems and hostilities will be
resolved diplomatically.
However, when major
altercations
arise
th::it
surpass
diplomatic
resolution,
assuming only the existence of
conventional weapons, ultimate reconciliation will
be obtained via the use of military arms.
This
decision by arms will occur when the strength of
one side or the other is exhausted.
Normally,
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the nation with the g-reater strength will have the
better chance of being victorious. However, let
us suppose at this point that the world we have
imagined is a nuclear world and that since neither
nation
has
a
military
capacity
which
is
subordinate to the other, their nuclear arsenals
are relatively equal both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
In a world in which nuclear
weapons exist, if both diplomatic and conventional
means fail to make reconciliation or deter
aggression, then the final means of national
defense (i.e., the defense of last resort) will
involve the threat to use nuclear weapons. Since
proposition (27) claims that both nation A and
nation B have a right to national defense, we will
assume that as a primary means of protection,
each nation threatens the other with nuclear
destruction.
As we discussed earlier, in order
for a threat to be credible, it must involve the
intention to actually carry out nuclear destruction
(for if one of the nations does not have this
intention, i.e., if that nation is bluffing, and the
opposition discovers this, then the threat will be
ineffective).
Obviously, however, if such an
intentional threat
is
made
actual,
it
will
unavoidably cause the deaths of a very large
number of people. We can continue our argument
by restating some of what has just been
expressed:
(28) As a primary means of national defense,
both nation A and nation B threaten
each other with nuclear destruction .
( 29) In order for a threat to be credible as
a means of protection, it must be
accompanied by the intention to carry
out the threat .
. ·. (30) The threats of nuclear destruction by
nations A and B against each other will
be accompanied by the intention to
carry out nuclear destruction.
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(31) But nuclear destruction unavoidably
causes the deaths of a very large
number of people .
. ·. (32) The mutual threats of nations A and B
will be accompanied by an intention to
take the lives of a very large number
of people.
(33) However, a means of national defense is
legitimate only if it falls within the
parameters set by morality (i.e. , only
if it is morally permissible) .
It is somewhat unclear whether or not a
threat with the intention to cause the deaths of a
large number of people is morally impermissible.
It certainly seems to be. However, there may be
circumstances in which an argument could be
given in favor of its moral permissibility.
For
example, suppose a large i;roup of people sought
to deprive another group of people of their lives
and/or fundamental values. It appears as thoug-h
a threat with the intention to kill the aggressors
might be morally permitted.
Nevertheless, even
though the permissibility in this case is unclear,
it is certainly the case, as proposition ( 4) has
already demonstrated, that

( 34) It is morally impermissible to take the
innocent life of another in order to
protect one's own life.
This,
of
However, we
derived from
we concluded

course,
refers
to
self-defense.
also argued that national defense is
principles of self-defense. Hence,
in proposition (7) that

(35) Nation::il defense is similar to protecting
one's own individual life .
. . . (36) It is morally impermissible to fake the
innocent lives of others ::is R means of
national defense.
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In addition, we also concluded, from the
Wrongful Intentions Principle, that not only is it
mor::illy impermissible to take the lives of innocent
people as a means of national defense,
(37) It is morally impermissible to intend (by
VJay of a threat) to take the lives of
innocent people as a means of national
defense
(partial
reiteration
from
proposition (8)) .
. ·. (38) On the one hand it is (a) morally
permissible to use nuclear deterrence as
a means of national defense when it
involves a threat with the intention to
kill innocent people, while on the other
hand it is (b) morally permissible when
such an intentional threat is not
involved
(reiteration
of proposition
(11)).

In order to discover whether or not the
mutual threats of nations A and B to use nuclear
weapons ::ire legitim::ite as a means of national
defense, we must determine whether or not these
threats ::ire morally permissible; and we can
determine this in two ways:
(a) if there is no
intention (to use nuclear weapons) connected with
the threat, then that threat will be permissible,
or (b) if there is an intention to use nuclear
weapons, but there are no innocent people who
will be affected, then that threat is permissible.
We have ::ilready argued and concluded that the
mutual threats of A and B involve the intention to
use nuc-lear weapons. - Thus, we must pursue
alternative (b) and try to determine whether the
people of either nation can be considered innocent
or not-innocent (i.e., accountable).
Prior to our introducing proposition (21) into
the argument, we stated that the people of a
community are able to collectively control their
government if and only if three specific legal
rights are held inviolate. From this statement we
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can construct an argument that will
determine innocence and accountability:

help

us

(39) If and only if the following three rights
obtain can it then be said that the
people of a nation are in collective
control of their government:
(a) the
right
of
the
people,
collectively, to determine who will
and will not occupy positions of
leadership within the government;
(b) the
right
of
the
people,
individually,
to
be
informed
concerning the opinions, decisions,
and policies of their leaders;
( c) the
right
o: the
people,
collectively,
to
influence
the
opinions, decisions, and policies of
their leaders.
( 40) If X controls Y, then it is within the
power of X to guide and direct Y. ·
( 41) If it is within the power of X to guide
and direct Y, then it i~ within the
6
power of X to determine Y. •
( 42) If it is within the power of X to
determine Y, thz'71 X can be held
responsible for Y .
. · . ( 43) If X controls Y, then X can be held
responsible for Y .
. · . ( 44) If it is within the collective power of
the people (X) to control the decisions
and policies of their leaders (Y), then
the people can be held responsible
(i.e., accountable) for those decisions
and policies .
. ·. ( 45) The people of a nation can be held
collectively accountable for the decisions
and policies of their leaders if and only
if these three rights are held inviolate.
If a community of people can be held collectively
accountable for a particular action, then each and
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every member of that community can be held
individually responsible for that action.
This is
true even if it is the case that certain members
had nothing at all to do with the bringing about
of the action.
To see why this is the case,
consider the following argument:
( 46) X is subject to pu '21fhment if and only
if X is accountable.
(47) If a group of people are collectively
accountable for a particular action, then
the group is subject to punishment.
( 48) The only means by which a group may
be punished is to punish its members .
. ·. ( 49) If a group- of people are subject to
punishment,
then
the
individual
members of that group are subject to
punishment.
(50) But we only punish people who can be
held
accountable
(from
proposition
(46)) .
. · .(51) If a group of people are collectively
accountable for a particular action, then
the members of the group can be held
individually accountable.
However, since the members of the group are not
necessarily directly accountable for the action, we
s::iy that they are vicariously accountable; that is,
the contributory fault is
assigned
to the
person(s) who perform(s) (or directly causes) the
act wherea s the liability is ascri~~d to the group
as a whole (i.e., collectively).
As a result,
proposition (51) should read as follows:
. ·. (51') If a group of people are collectively
accountable for a particular action, then
the members of the group can be held
individually
vicariously
accountable;
otherwise,
there
is
no
vicarious
accountability.
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From this proposition we may conclude that:
. ·. (52) If the people of a nation can be held
collectively accountable for the decisions
and policies of their leaders, then each
individual
member
c:rn
be
held
vicariously
accountable
for
those
decisions and policies; otherwise, they
are not held vicariously accountable.
What proposition (52) seems to tell us is that
if there is a community of people that can be
considered as a collective whole and if this group
holds these rights inviolate, then this community
will have collective control over its leaders and
the
policies
they
make.
Thus,
collective
accountability assumes (a) that there is community
that can be considered as a collective whole and
(b) that this community holds these rig-hts
inviolate for its members. In order, however, for
a group to be considered as a collective whole,
three criteria must be satisfied: (a ) there is a
1
recognition among community members
of basic,
common values; (a ) there is a common sentiment
2
(i.e. , emotional significance) towards these basic
values; and (a ) the members of the group share
a common lot 3(i.e., the extent to which their
goods and harms are necessarily collective ars~
indivisible) with respect to these basic values.
In the absence of either (a) or (b), therefore,
there can be no collective accountability. Thus,
as we attempt to determine whether or not the
people
of
either
nation
Rre
innocent
or
not-innocent (i.e., accountable), we must decide
whether or not these rights ::i.re held inviolate;
and, if they are held inviolate, whether or not
they ::i.re held inviolate for a community of people
that can be considered as a collective whole.
Concerning nation B, we said that its
military aims are accomplished via the institution
of a central economic plan that would direct the
efforts of the people tow11rd military superiority.
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We also noted, however, that the success of this
plan required the government to intervene in the
lives of its citizens in order to enforce
conformance.
Insofar as the state forces an
individual to comply with the central plan, it
gains control over the life of that individual. If
this is generalized to include all people under the
, government's jurisdiction, then ~e state gains
control over all of its citizens.
But if the
government controls the lives of the people, then
it cannot be said that the people control the
government.
However, as proposition ( 39) has
already indicated, if the people do not control the
government, then the specific rights are not held
inviolate. Thus,
(53) The government of nation B does not
hold these rights inviolate for its
citizens .
. ·. (54) The people of nation B cannot be held
collectively accountable for the decisions
and policies of their leaders .
. ·. (55) The people of nation B cannot be held
individually vicariously accountable for
(i.e.,
they are innocent of)
the
decisions and policies of their leaders.
On the other hand, nation A, whose aim it is
to protect individual autonomy, does secure these
rights for its citizens. What we must determine
now is whether or not the people of nation A
satisfy the criteria for being considered a
collective whole. We will, at this point, assume
that the criteria. are fulfilled, but for obvious
reasons.
Since the members of nation A are
bound within a society which acknowledges human
life to be of supreme worth,
there will
undoubtedly be a recognition of some common,
basic values. This is reinforced by the fact that
they seek to protect one of these values
(autonomy), which in turn alludes to the notion
of a common sentiment. Finally, they all share in
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the same lot , for inasmuch as autonomy is
subverted, the ends in life that they desire may
be overturned. Thus, we shall assume that the
people of nation A constitute a collective whole.
Therefore,
(56) The government of nation A does hold
these rights inviolate for its citizens
(which may be perceived as a collective
body) .
. ·. (57) The people of nation A can be held
collectively accountable for the decisions
and policies of their leaders .
. ·. (58) The people of nation A can be held
individually
vicariously
accountable
(i.e. , not-innocent of) the decisions
and policies of their leaders.
In accordance with our conclusions in propositions
(11) and (38), we can state that
. · . (59) The intended nuclear threat of nation A
against nation B is morally impermissible
whereas the intended nuclear threat of
nation B · against nation A is morally
permissible.
If we add to proposition (59) the information
arrived at in proposition (22), (24), and (33),
then we can state our final conclusion as follows:
. ·. (60) Nation A, whose government should be
promoted, cannot legitimately protect
itself by way of a threat with the
intention to use nuclear weapons against
nation B, whereas n:::ition B, whose
government should not be promoted,
can legitimately protect itself against
nation A by way of a threat with the
intention to use nuclear weapons.
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What we have demonstrated to this point is
that is is possible for instances to arise in which
nuclear deterrence is morally permissible and that
we can conceive of a situation which appears to
be a morally peculiar state of affairs involving
nuclear deterrence and national defense.
To
conclude this essay, it will be instructive to
attempt to find a solution to this perplexing state
of affairs. I would like to present three possible
solutions. The first two deal with the absolute
nature of some critical propositions in the
argument whereas the final solution challenges the
application of the Wrongful Intentions Principle in
the case of deterrent intentions.
We asserted, at the beginning of this essay,
that human life has supreme worth. However, we
immediately saw that this statement was in need of
conceptual qualification, for in circumstances
involving aggression and defense, we felt that
innocent human life (i.e., life not responsible for
aggressive or threatening behavior) was more
precious than accountable human life (i.e. ·, life
that is responsible for aggressive or threatening
behavior). We concluded that even though human
life is of supreme worth, there is a logical
priority of innocent life over accountable life.
Thus, all things considered, it is innocent human
life that is of supreme worth. This, perhaps, is
the most important statement in this entire essay
for it tells us that, vis-a-vis all other objects to
which moral value may be imputed, the highest
degree of value is bestowed upon innocent human
life. There is no other object such that, when
juxtaposed to innocent human life, it may take
moral precedence.
What this means is that,
within the context of all other moral objects,
innocent human life has absolute worth and as
such, cannot be violated. The critical conclusion
that
we
derived
from
this
statement
(in
combination with the Wrongful Intentions Principle
and proposition (7)) was that it is morally
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impermissible to intend to take the lives of
innocent human beings as a means of national
defense (proposition (8)).
This, too, is an
absolute proposition.
We arrive now at a
crossroads in which we must either affirm the
Absolute nature of this proposition or deny it. In
either case, there is the possibility of a solution.
First, let us assume (as the argument does)
that this proposition is absolute.
With this
assumption, there are two different ways by
which a solution can be approached.
We can
either demonstrate that nation A cAn legitimately
protect itself (via nuclear deterrence)- against
nation B or we can demonstrate that nation B
cannot legitimately protect itself (via nucleHr
deterrence) against nation A.
Proposition ( 45)
tells us that the people of a nation are
collectively accountable if and only if rights (a)
through (c) are held inviolflte; and proposition
(52) tells us that if collective accountability
obtains, then the individuals within the collective
group are vicariously accountable. We will have a
solution, therefore, regardless of the approach we
choose, if we can show either th::it the people of
nation A cannot be held individually vicariously
accountAble or that the people of nation B c::in be
held accountable in this way.
The reader will
note, however, that we have already established
the opposite of what we need to demonstrate in
order to arrive at a solution.
Nevertheless,
there may be a loophole. The people of nation A
were
seen
to
be
individually
vicariously
accountable not only because the three rights
were protected but also because they formed a
collective community. There is in this conclusion,
however, an unstated assumption that the people
are capable of being held accountable for such a
nuclear threat.
This assumption seems to be
valid except in one particular case. There exists
a group of individuals, within the collective
group, to whom accountability, by definition,
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. cannot be ascribe~
is the group composed
2 This
of little children.
This means that there is a
g-roup within the collective community of nation A
thRt cannot be held individually vicariously
accountable for their nation's nuclear threat. If
these little children cannot be held accountable,
then they must be innocent; and if they are
innocent, then that would preclude the moral
permissibility of nation B's intentional threat
against nation A, for it would involve the
intention to cause the deaths of innocent people.
A rejoinder to this might be that little children do
not belong within the collective group; and, since
the intentional threat is only against the collective
group, there would be no intention to take the
lives of innocent people.
Thus, proposition (8)
is not violated. The problem with this rejoinder
is that it neglects to distinguish between the
conceptual enumeration of who does and does not
belong within the collective group and the actual
enumer::ition of the members of the society. Even
though the little children may not be within the
collective enumeration, they are physically located
among the members of this group.
Thus, any
intentional threat against the collective group will
unavoidably entail an intentional threat against
innocent
children;
and
this
is
morally
impermissible.
The second approach to a solution ultimately
requires that we deny that proposition ( 8) is
absolute. In order to do this we must show that
there is good reason to believe that the
intentional threat to cause the death of innocent
human beings is not absolutely prohibited. This
threat
can
be
divided into
two
separate
components: (a) a declarative threat in which a
decl::iration is made to the citizens of the opposing
nation that they will be killed if they behave in
certain ways and (b) an imposition of :flsk (i.e.,
they are put under the risk of death) .
If both
the threat and the content of the threat (i.e. ,
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the imposition of risk) are shown not to exhibit
an absolute prohibition, then we will have good
reasons for denying the absolute nature of the
intentional threat to cause the deaths of innocent
people as a means of national defense; and this
constitutes a denial of the absoluteness of
proposition (8). We shall begin, then, with the
declarative threat. First of all, there seem to be
four ways in which declarative threats nre
thought to be morally impermissible: (a Y threats
are often
counter-productive
and
sometimes
encourage the impermissible conduct they attempt
to deter; (b) they may be effective in deterring
permissible conduct (thereby restricting- the
threatened party's rightful liberty); (c) they may
cause fear and anxiety; and (d) their use may
damage relations between the parties involved.
None of these, however, seem to be the kinds of
consideratio~,r
that would support an absolute
prohibition.
There seem to be no compelling
reasons why we should suppose that declarative
threats should not be permitted when it is the
case that the above features are, for the most
part, absent.
For example, imagine that a
declarative threat will probably be effective, is
aimed at preventing impermissible behavior, does
not cause an extreme amount of anxiety (compared
to alternative courses of action open to the
threatener) since the people being threatened are
accustomed to living with it,
and is not
destructive of relations between the parties
involved because threats of this kind are
considered to be a normal element in those
relations. It is not likely that this type of threat
is impermissible simply because it is a threat.
Nevertheless, there are some who would argue
that the declarative threat involved in nuclear
deterrence is just of this type. It seems unlikely
that simply a declarative threat alone is sufficient
reason to suppose that it is absolutely prohibited
to make a threat to take the lives of a large
number of innocent people.
It certainly seems
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possible that the h::id effects that a declarative
threat may produce could be overriden by the
benefits of the threat.
1n this case, such a
35
threat would be justified.
This brings us to the second component of
deterrent threats and the imposition of risk. It
is also the point at which the third possible
solution comes in, for the imposition of risk
entails the intention to do harm (which will
involve the Wrongful Intentions Principle). What
we need to demonstrate is that there is at least
one set of circumstances in which the Principle
does not apply. If we can do this, then not only
will we be able to deny the efficacy of proposition
(6) is an important instance, we will also be able
to deny the absoluteness of proposition (8). To
begin, it seems clear that the Wrongful Intentions
Principle connects the morality of an intention
solely to the moral . qualities of the intended act.
Thus, if the actual performance of an act is
wrong, the§1 to (knowingly) intend to perform it
6
is wrong.
As we noted earlier in our
discussion, this is not unreasonable since it is
typically the case that the only significant effects
of intentions are the acts of the agent (and the
consequences of these acts) which flow from these
intentions. However, it is important to note that
there are certain situations in which intention may
have effects that are independent of the intended
act's actually being performed.
For example,
intentions to act may have the effect of
influencing the conduct of other people. And it
may be the case that some of these effects would
not be morally impermissible. If so, ~lie Wrongful
Intentions Principle would not apply.
In order
to demonstrate this, it is essential to note that
the Principle applies to standard conditional
intentions in the same nwrner that it applies to
non conditional intentions.
This means that if it
would be wrong to perform an action in certain
circumstances, then it is also wrong to intend to
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perform that act on the condition that those
circumstances arise.
However, although the
Wrongful Intentions Principle applies, for t-he most
part, to conditional intentions,
there is a
sub-class of such intentions to which the
principle does not seem to apply.
These are
deterrent intentions,
i.e. ,
those conditional
intentions whose existence depends upon the
person's desire to deter others from pe1JWrming
the antecedent condition of the intention.
The
unique nature of these intentions can be
explained by the distinction that can be shown
between intending to do something and desiring
(or intending) to intend to do it. In most cases,
an individual will form the intention to perform an
act because he either desires doing that act as an
end in itself or as a means to other ends. Thus,
in these cases, the reasons behind desiring to
intend to perform an act are that the agent wants
to perform the acts. This is not the case with
deterrent intentions.
In these situ::ttions, the
desire to form an intention is entirely distinct
from any desire to carry it out. Thus, in these
cases, the reasons behind desiring to intend to
perform an act are not that the person wants to
perform the act, buTI'or other reasons (i.e., to
prevent harm). Hence, while it may certainly be
the case that the object of an individual's
deterrent intention might be an evil act, it does
not follow that, in desiring to adopt that
intention, he desires to do evil, either as an end
or a means. The central point seems to be that
deterrent intentions are not intentions to do
harm, rather they are intentions to prevent
undesirable circumstances from coming 11bout.
And in fact, if a deterrent intention fulfills its
purpose, it thereby ensures that the intended
(and possibly evil) act is not performed by
preventing the circumstances of performance from
arising. Therefore, deterrent intentions seem to
prevent evil from occurring, and this is :rn
acceptable consequence. The Wrongful r~ entions
0
Principle does not ::ipply in this situation.
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How does this help us? It is possibly the
case that the intentions connected with the thrent
involved in nuclear deterrence are just the sort
of deterrent intentions we have been discussing.
This would mean that the reasons grounding the
desire on the part of nation A to form an
intention to cause the deaths of innocent people
would not be to carry out the intention, rather
they would be to prevent the circumstances of
performance from arising (i.e., to prevent harm).
In these cases, the Wrongful Intentions Principle
does not apply. Now, if this is the case (and it
seems to be), then not only may we deny the
absolute nature of declarative threats, we may
also deny that the content of the threat is
absolutely prohibited. In doing this, we negate
the absolute prohibition against the intentional
threat to cause the deaths of innocent people as a
means of national defense (proposition (8)).
To summarize, we stated previously that we
would have a solution if we could either
demonstrate that nation A can legitimately protect
itself (via nuclear deterrence) against nation B or
if we could demonstrate that nation B cannot
legitimately protect itself (via nuclear deterrence)
against nation A.
The foregoing discussion
accommodates both of these approaches.
First,
we just demonstrated that the absolute nature of
proposition (8) may be denied. If the intentional
threat to cause the deaths of innocent people as a
means of nation defense is not absolutely morally
impermissible, then the possibility exists that
nation A can legitimately protect itself by way of
nuclear deterrence.
Second, we demonstrated
that even proposition (8) remains absolute, since
little
children
cannot
he
held
individually
vicariously
accountable,
nation
B
cannot
legitimately protect itself, by · means of nuclear
deterrence, against nation A.
In
have,

achieving the aims of this essay, we
in addition, accomplished two important
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purposes.
First, we have gained, within a
specific context, a simple, abstract or conceptual
understanding of the moral permissibility of
nuclear deterrence. Given the logical method by
which we have arrived at this understanding, we
can be assured that if our premises are true,
then our conclusions must be true, for that is the
nature of valid arguments. For some, this simple
understanding is satisfying in and of itself.
This,
however
brings
us
to
the - second
achievement which is that in gaining such a
conceptual understanding, we have laid the
foundation for its practical application.
It is
possible,
at
this
point,
to
analogize
the
proposition of our imaginary world to situations in
our present world. If there is enough similarity
in relevant respects, then the conclusions arrived
at in the essay will be applicable to current
circumstances. Although we will not now attempt
to provide such an analogy, this essay may serve
as its preface.
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are saying is that if these rights obtain, then the
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( 1)
(2)

(3)

. · . ( 4)

(5)

. · . ( 6)
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If the people have collective power over
the government, then they have the
ability to collectively affect the behavior
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can
(collectively) pick their leaders and
influence their opinions, desires, and
policies .
If the people collectively control the
government, then they have the ability
to collectively determine who their
leaders will be and to influence their
opinions, decision and policies.
However, rights (a) and (c) guarantee
that the people will hRve the ability to
collectively determine who their leaders
will be and to collectively influence the
behavior of these leaders .
If the people have collective control,
then rights (a) and (c) obtain.

This gives us one of the conditionals of the
entailment. The second conditional is obtained by
simply working throug-h the Rrgument in reverse
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(1') If rights (a) and (c) obtain, then the
people have the ability to collectively
determine who their leaders will be and
to collectively influence the behRvior of
these leaders.
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neglects to lock the door again, but fail to kill
him only because he happens (fortuitously) to
lock the door. It seems to be the case that I am
as bad (or almost as bad) as if he had failed to
lock the door and I had killed him. My failure to
perform the act no more erases the wrongness of
the simple (nonconditional) intention to kill him.
Ibid.

39 1b1"d.,
40

Ibid.

pp. 9'"' 90 - 91 .
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THE FEDERALIST AND THE FOUNDING:
TWO VIEWS OF
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
Nathan Webster Jones*
Introduction
The Federalist Papers, written primarily by
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton under the
pseudonym Publius, have been the focal point for
the study of American political philosophy for
almost two hundred years.
The papers_ were
written as editorials arguing for the ratification of
the Philadelphia draft of the Constitution, and
appeared in several New York newspapers before
being collected in a single volume.
Tpey are
"America's premier book about politics."
Even
more important to this study, they are the
"premier book" about the politics which shaped
America's
founding.
The
authors
of
the
Federalist played key roles in the formation and
the enactment of the American government, and
the papers are considered by many to be the most
profound.2 expression of the political science of the
framers.
Th us, to study the "science of
politics," to use Hamilton's phrase from the
Federalist, is to study the "science of politics"
that played the key role in the founding of
American government. This report, however, is
not limited strictly to studies of the Federalist,
but will. examine several general studies of the
*Nathan is a junior majoring in Political
Science.
He has been a member of the BYU
Honors Program Student Council. His plans are
to attend law school after he completes his
undergraduate degree.
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intellectual ori~:rns of the
them to the Federalist.

founding

and

relate

The
general
studies
of
the
founding
examined in this report are expressive of
a
range
of
scholarly
oprn1on
concerning
the
intellectual origins of American
g-overnment.
Scholars generally, especially when they are not
writing biographies,
consider the founding's
intellectual origins not on the basis of single
individuals but on the basis of the group that
created the Americ:rn government.
Although a
great diversity of opinion may have existed among
the framers at the time of the founding, when the
thought and motivations of the framers Hre
examined, they are often examined collectively.
The plurality of political opinions which
existed at the time of the founding, and which
the Federalist predicted would continue to exist in
America (while prescribing- measures in hopes of
diminishing
the
negative
effects
of
widely
divergent political opinions), seem to have only
foreshadowed the range of opinions which have
developed about The Federalist Papers themselves
over
the
past
seventy
ye::irs.
From
the
publishing of the first paper, individuals of
varying political orientations h::ive expressed
markedly different opinions about Publius's work.
However, in 1913. the publishing of "Charles A.
Beard's
An
Economic
Interpretation
of
the
Constitution of the united States started a new
3
turn in the debate."
Beard, in his attempt to examine the
motivations of the framers, discovered evidence
which, he argued, strongly sugg-ested that the
major influence upon the framers was material
self-interest. Doug-lass Adair, however, added a
second "turn in the debate" and accepted the
validity of Beard's theory only in a limited sense.
Adair felt "Beard's rese::irch threw a brilliant
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heam
of light
on
certain
facets
of
the
Constitution, [but] his aim was selective, and by
highlighting special features of the docuflent he
thereby cast others into deep obscurity."
Other
scholars, before Adair, may have felt similarly
about some of the detail in Beard's work. Beard,
himself, later allowed that forces other than
economics played a significant role in the
5
founding.
Adair, however, was the first to
actually throw significant "beams of light" into
the areas obscured by the shadows of Beard's
examination of 1913.
In his attempt to determine what these
shadows contained, Adair examined the desire
shown by the framers for a sort of eternal fame,
their attempt to incorporate the philosophy of the
Scottish Enlightenment, and the careful study of
history made by a few of the framers. These, he
believed, were the keys to a more complete
understanding of the framers' motivations.
The arg·uments · of these two scholars, and
some of those who have followed in their
footsteps, ::is it were, will constitute the main
body of this study.
The Founders of the Theories
Charles A. Beard
Charles
A.
Beard
said,
"interpretative
schools
see~
always to originate in social
::int::igonisms."
This
statement
is
certainly
correct with regard to the interpretative school
he founded.
Richard Hofst::idter, who acclaims
Beard's Economic Interpretation as "a hig-h point"
in modern critical scholarship, describes the
context in which the work was written:
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The antagonism, long latent, between
the philosophy of the Constitution and
the philosophy of American democracy
again came into the open.
Professor
Beard's work appeared in 1913 at the
peak of the Progressive era, when the
muckraking fever was still high; some
readers tended to conclude from his
findings that the Fathers were selfish
reactionaries who do not dese.rve their
high place in American esteem.
If some readers concluded that the framers were
selfish reactionaries, then Be:::ird's book served its
purpose well, for this was his intention in writing
the work. Beard and others felt that reverencing
the past, particularly the founding, was affecting
the present negatively.
It seemed to breed a
sort of conservatism that was holding back "social
progress"; thus, they sought to debunk the
founding in i1opes of eliminating some of this
conservatism.

Despite its rather pointed intentions, the
Economic Interpretation has had a powerful effect
on the scholarly view of the founding. A school
of political scientists and historfans has followed,
creating· a school of thought which sees the
founding as the product of a politically elite
group of men responding to the economic ::ind
social forces of their times.
Douglass Adair
Douglass Adair, who began th e m::iin body of
his work in the late 1940s a nd early 1950s, has,
like Beard, been accused of responding to "social
antagonisms."
J a mes
Conniff
argues
that
"Adair . . . sought to dispute the claims of
Charles Beard and to reRssert the integrity of
those who ~rote and enncted the America n
Constitution."
Conniff continues,
criticizing
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Adair for being "more interested in finding some
intellectual and philosophic influence on the
formation of Madison's thought than in [finding
the correct source] or % spelling- out the precise
nature of its influence."
Many, however, would
disagree with Conniff's criticisms, and Adair's
theory has spawned a number of followers,
creating a school of thought which sees the
framers as motivated more by the individual
desire for fame and by intellectual forces than by
the socioeconomic forces which were asserted by
the Beardians.
The Theories
Charles A. Beard and Economic Determinism
Charles Beard, in his Economic Interpretation, asserts that Madison and Hamilton were
America's premier economic determi nists:
The
Federalist . . . presents
in
a
relatively brief and systematic form an
economic
interpretation
of
the
Constitution by the men best fitted,
through intimate knowledge of the ideals
of the Framers, to expound the political
science of the new Government.
This
is . . . in fact the finest study on the
economic interpretation of politics which
exists in any language; and whoever
would understand the Constitution ::is an
economic qocument
need hardly go
1
beyond it.
Beard also asserts, rather ironically, that
the Constitution, which the Federalist authors
played key roles in creating- and enacting-, is the
product of economic forces. He argues that there
were sever::il powerful economic interest groups
who stood to g-::iin materially if the Constitution
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were to be enacted and a strong- central government created. He concludes that the commercial
interests looked "upon the adoption of the
Constitution as the sure guarantee" lthat their
property interests would be protected.
Beard continues by asserting that the weak
central government created by the Articles of
Confederation was unfavorable to property rights
and that the movement for the Constitut-ion was,
at its highest levels, fu~~amentally a movement to
protect property rights.
Beard further contends that the delegate
selection process to the Constitutional Convention
was essentially rigged so that only members of
certain economic groups arrived in Philadelphia as
delegates.
He cites as prime evidence the fact
that the delegates were chosen, not by the
people, but by the state legislatures, and that
there were property qmilific::ition 141ws plRced on

voters and legislators before 1787.

1

In
order
to
further
strengthen
his
assertions, Beard examines the financial status of
each delegate in an attempt to determine if the
delegates "represent [ ed] distinct groups whose
economic interests they understood ::i.nd felt in
concrete,
definite
form
through
their
own
personal
experience
with
identical
property
rights, or [if they] were . . . working merely
under the guid115ce of abstract principles of
political science."
This survey
conclusions:

brings

Beard

to

the

following

Not one memher [delegate] represented
in his immediate personal economic
interests the small farming or mech::i.nic
classes. The overwhelming m::i.jority of
members, nt least five-sixths, were
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immediately, directly, and personally
interested in the outcome of their l::ibors
at Philadelphia, and were to a greater
or lesser extent economic beneficiarif6>
from the adoption of the Constitution.
Having shown that the delegates were,
economically at least, a homogeneous group that
stood to gain from a strong national government,
Beard finally concludes that the Constitution
itself, despite its lack of economic terms and no
mention of social class, is fundamentally an
17
economic document.
Beard's Assertions

~md

the Federalist

Beard's assertions, as they relate to the
authors of The Federalist Papers, are that
Madison and Hamilton were not influenced by any
historical or philosophical forces, but were only
influenced by intellectual forces insofar as those
forces were pliable to the economic force which
really molded
their thinking.
Simply put,
economic forces created the Constitution and
consequently the Federalist; and, as Beard views
it,
those forces were material self-interest.
Thus, the arguments for the Constitution in the
Federalist must be the subtle expression of
self-interest, and therefore constitute propaganda
for the cause of ratifying an economically inspired
document - -the Constitution of the United States.
Douglass
Adair
and
Fame,
the
Scottish
Enlightenment, and the Importance of History
Adair felt Beard's definition of self-interest
in purely economic terms was "simple·r n1inded" and
represented an "artful selectivity."
He does
not
directly dispute Beard's assertion
that
economic forces played a role in motiv:::iting the
framers.
However, the conclusions he draws
after studying the framers' motivations severely
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limit the
founding.

role

economic

forces

pl::iyed

in

the

Adair did not consider economic and other
social or intellectual forces to be mutually
exclusive.
Beard, however, in his Economic
Interpret::ition founds his theory on a belief that
these forces are fundamentally mutu::illy exclusive.
He does this by arguing that the power of
material self-interest is so much greater than the
power of ideas that the power of ideas is
negligible
191
comparison
with
m::iterial
1
self-interest.
Be::ird is essentially arguing- that
men are never iclealog-ues except when ideology
serves their material self-interest.
Adair felt
that the framers were self-interested, but that
their self-interest w::is much more subtle than the
overt economic self-interest depicted in Beard's
Economic Interpretation.
Fame and the Founding.
Adair, in his
examin::ition of the possible motivations of the
framers, discovered a profound "sense of history"
that seemed to overtake the framers as they
worked. He describes them as becoming
fantastically concerned with posterity's
judgment of their behavior. And since
they are concerned with the im;:ige that
will remain in the world's eye, "that
love of fame which is the ruling passion
of the
noblest
minds,"
to
quote
Hamilton, becomes a spur and ;:i goad
that urges some of them to act with a
nobleness and a greatness that t~Uir
earlier careers had hardly hinted at.
Adair shows that many of the framers did
not begin their work with lofty Rmhitions.
However, between the time of the issuing of the
Declar::ition of Independence and the Philadelphia
Convention mRny of these men developed ;:i
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growing sense of the potential for lasting- fame
their situation had provided them.
This "sense
of history," which Adair describes as molding a
change in the Framers thinking, is summarized by
the statement, cited by Adair, of John Adams to
Richard Henry Lee: "You and I, my dear friend,
have been sent into life at a time when the
greatest law~ ers of antiquity would have wished
1 The Founders began to realize
to be alive."
thHt what they were doing would live in history,
Hnd thHt consequently they too, like the famed
ancient lawgivers, might be immortal.
Adair
argues that, as a result, the Founders went
beyond themselves in order to achieve a form of
secula r
immortality.
He
cites
as
evidence
Virginia, which had in 1787 only 400,000 white
inhabitants;
and
yet
that
small
population
produced, in the short space of a sing-le
generation, &iz number of men that history will
never forget.
Adair also shows that this desire for fame
was not looked upon pejoratively in the eighteenth
century. The desire for fame was considered an
enabling- emotion because it led on2 to do things
3
which were worthy of remembr:rnce.
Adair concludes:
"The love of Fame is a
noble passion because it can transform ambition
and self-interest into dedicated effort for the
community, because it can spur individuals to
spend themselves to provide for the common
defense, or to promote the general welfare, and
even on _ occasion to- establish j~~tice in a world
where justice is extremely rare."
Fundamentally, Adair's argument is that the
economic forces, which Beard saw as the prime
motivator, were overwhelmed by the force of the
frHmers' desire to be remembered well by history.
Thus, the desire for fame is , in Adair's view, the
prime motivator.
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The Scottish Enlightenment, the Study of
History, and the Founding.
In Adair's view,
what further solidified his assertion that economic
forces were only secondary was the link which he
discovered between the Scottish Enlightenment
and some of the framers, particularly between
Federalist author James Madison and David Hume,
the
e1g-hteenth-century
Scottish
philosopher.
Adair calls Madison "the most creative and
philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of
science and politics," citing Madison's ability to
"set his limited personal experience in the context
of men in other ages and times, thus giving ex~:ga
reaches of insight to his political formulations." ·
According to Adair, the Scottish system of
philosophy
rested on one basic assumption, had
developed its own special method, Hnd
kept
to
a
consistent
aim.
The
assumption was "thnt there is a great
uniformity among the actions of all men,
in all nations and ages, and that human
nature still remains the s::ime, in its
principles and operations.
The same
motives
always
produce
the
same
actions; the same events follow from the
same causes . . . .
Would you know
the sentiments, inclinations, and course
of life of the Greeks and Romans?
Study well the temper and ::ictions of
the French and English . . . "--thus
David Hume, present[ed] t~ hasis of a
science of human behavior.~
Adair
believes
these
elements
of
Scottish
philosophy appear directly in Madison's worJ~.
Adair felt his theories were clearly vRlidHted by
Madison's belief in a science of politics and by
Madison's careful study of history, which the
Scottish "science of human behavior" prescribed.
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Adair's Theories and the Federalist. Ad::lir
asserts that the authors of The Federalist Papers
were not overwhelmingly influenced by material
self-interest.
They were, however, overwhelmingly influenced by a desire for eternal fame.
This desire led them to strive beyond what might
be
considered
their
normal
capacities
in
producing, what they thought would be, a
"monument" worthy of lasting fame.
His second
assertion, that the thought of the framers was
directly influenced by Scottish philosophy, gives
the Federalist an intellectual base. If one accepts
Beard's arguments, the Federalist must be little
more than clever propaganda defending the
economic interests of the elite; but with Adair's
argument the Federalist becomes a profound
expression of Madison and Hamilton's interpretation of Scottish philosophy with a careful
study of the history of governments thrown in.
The Followers of the Theories
As
has
been
stated,
two
diverging
philosophies about the founding have emerged as
a result of the work of Charles Beard and
Dougl::tss Adair.
If Beard's influence created a
scholarly tidal wave, drowning out old notions
and pushing new ideas ahead, Adair's work
served as a first major dike, slowing- the force of
this particular rushing wave.
Those who have
followed have largely sought to add either
additional water to the wave or earth to the dike.
While nll the scholars of the founding may not be
the direct intellectual descendants of these two
men, their original theories relate to much of the
recent scholarship on the subject, RS may be seen
in the following catalogue of some of the more
recent and important work on the founding-.
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Robert A. Dahl views the founding, as did
Beard,
as larg-ely the product of material
self-interest. Dahl states:
to some extent, they (the Framers)
elevated
their
own
privileges
into
universal matters of abstract right and
universal right;
groups who might
interfere with their privileges were, in
their eyes, dangerous factions. In t"his
respect, they carried partisan attitudes
into the Convention, yet were usually
unaware that they did so.
They were
not
~cessarily
cynical,
merely
human.
Whereas Beard sees the Founding Fathers as an
elite that came to the Convention as part of
economically interested conspiracy, Dahl sees the
Convention delegates as "merely human," unable
to see beyond the horizon created by their
individu.al interests.
Dahl's argument centers on his belief that
the forces which moved the framers were bigger
than the framers themselves. Thus, he does not
hold
them
completely
responsible
for
the
government they created:
Without seriously qualifying, much less
abandoning
their
universal
norms
(morals), they nonetheless created a
government
that
would
demand
obedience to its laws from a majority of
adults--women, non-whites, and some
white mHles--who were excluded from
active participation in making those
laws, whether directly 28 through their
elected representatives.
Thus, Dahl believes that the creation of a
self-interested and undemocratic government was
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not an act of gross immorality on the part of the
framers,
but
was
to
be
expected
under
circumstances where the majority in society were
unable
to
express
their
interests
in
the
Constitution-making process.
Gordon S. Wood feels class interest was a
prime motivating factor in the founding. A major
element of Wood's thesis is evident in the
following statement:
Eighteenth-century leaders took it for
granted that society was a hierarchy of
finely
graded
ranks
and
degrees
divided vertically into interests and
lines of personal interest, rather than
as today into horiz2~tal cleavages of
class and occupation.
Despite
the
fact
that
Wood
divides
the
eighteenth-century class system vertically, he
still contends that a sense of elitist protectionism
influenced the framers.
He states, "Members of
the elite debated endlessly over what constituted
the proper char:::icter for a gentleman . . . but
they never really questioned the leaders~.e of the
society by :rn aristocracy of some sort."
Wood
believes that those already in social leadership
positions did not question, in any democratic
way, their right to rule.
Thus, the framers
created a government which placed impediments to
democracy in order to protect what the elite saw
as their inherent right.
Richard
Hofstadter
seems
to
have
synthesized a number of widely divergent notions
about the founding. He believes, as Beard does,
that the framers created the government for
commercial reasons; ::is Wood does, that the
framers were anti-democratic and elitists; and
that the framers were, first and foremost,
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influenced
concludes:

by

Thomas

Hobbes. 31

Hofstadter

(The framers) accepted the mercantile
image of life as an eternal battleground,
and assumed the Hobbesian war of e::i.ch
against all; they did not propose to put
an end to this war, but merely to
stabilize it and make it less murde~ous.
They had no hope and they offered
none for any ultimate organic ·change in
the way men conduct themselves. · The
result was that while they thought
self-interest the most dRngerous and
unbrookable quality in man, ·they neces~a1;Hy underwrote it in trying to control
It.
Hofstadter felt that the Hobbesian view of man
was so powerfully entrenched in the minds of the
framers that it was the prime motivating force in
their creation of a government.
This view of
man, Hofstadter theorizes, created in the fr a mers
a fear of the other classes of society, which, in
turn, led to the anti-democratic, self-interested
and protectionist form of government which he
feels was created at Philadelphia.
Martin Diamond also takes a rather synthetic
view of past scholarship.
He, however, unlike
Dahl, Wood, or Hofstadter takes as ::i mai~ source
3 Yet
of inspiration not Beard, but Adair.
Diamond a grees, in a limited sense, with Be::ird
that economic fact'3~s play a role in sh apin g
political structures.
However, h e believes th e
key to understanding the founding lies in intellectual development of several of the key fr a mers.
Diamond asserts that the framers, MRdison in
particular, rejected many of the political traditions based on Classical and Christian political
philosophy Rnd turned instea d to "such politkRl
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philosophers as Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, and
Locke," rho h::id developed "a new science of
3 based on a realistic view of man.
politics"
These political philosophers brought man down
from the pedesfal of "perfection" as the Classical
::ind Christian philosophers thought he "ought" to
be, and viewed him "as he actually is." Diamond
nrg-ues that the framers,
again Madison in
particular, wholeheartedly accepted these notions,
and they felt that with this new "view of man"
the problems of republican
and
democratic
government, which had in the past ap13iared to
have no solution, could now be resolved.
Diamond further argues that it was this "new
science of politics" with its view of man "as he
actually is" which gave an anti-democratic tilt to
the Constitution, a tilt which those of the Beardian school attribute to material self-interest. In
direct contrast to Dahl and others, he states that
"the American political order was deliberately
tilted to resist, so to speak, the upward gravitational pull of politics toward the grand, dramatic,
character-enabling but soJiety-wracking opinions
about justice and virtue."
The new Enlightenment sense of realism required the fr::imers to
reject older republican notions about m::in in relation to "justice and virtue."
However, Diamond contends that simply because the framers rejected older notions "regarding- virtue, they did not thereby abandon the
pursuit of ;1gtue or excellency in all other possible wfiys."
He asserts this because Enlightenment philosophy, as perceived by Madison and
others among the framers, does not reject the
possibility for virtue in man; the system, in a
sense, plans for the worst and expects to produce the best, not perfection but the hest.
Diamond concludes:
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The Founding- becomes more than an
arrangement of the passions and interests; when "venerated" hy the people,
it can serve as an ethical admonition to
the people, teaching- them to subdue
dangerous impulses of passion and interest.
This goes far in the direction
of genuine republican virtue, but it
still rests on the mild and merely declaratory tutelage of the Founding, -not
th~ ste3§er stuff of ancient political
science.

Diamond sees an intellectual base for the founding
primarily as a result of the assimilation of
Scottish philosophy by several of the key framers
which produced in these men definite beliefs
about what government could be and wh::it it
oug-ht to be.
Garry Wills takes the theory of Scottish
philosophic::il influence several steps beyond either
Adair or Diamond.
He contends, as did Adair,
that lfoine directly influenced l\fadison on a number c1f iE.E:"c es. P.owever, in his book Explaining
America, Wills finds a greater number of direct
correlations between Hume and Madison than A d::iir
probably ever thought possible and morEtio than
many scholars today believe are possible.
In
order to. validate his thesis, Wills points to a
number of specific political doctrines espoused by
Madison and then points to what he believes are
the antecedents to these doctrines in th.fl writing-s
of the Scottish philosopher David Hume.
James Conniff places a slightly different
emphasis on the theory of the influence of
Scottish philosophy.
He disagrees with Adair's
thesis that the main link between Scottish
philosophy was from Hume to Madison.
Instead
he asserts that link was from Fr::incis Hutcheson
to Madison, and that Madison's own g-overnmental
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experience in combination with his Hutchesoninspired education had much more to do wit~ the
2
shaping of Madison's thought than did Hume.
Conniff describes Madison's education, asserting that in that educational process Hutcheson
was much more likely to be influential than Hume.
He also describes Madison's years of public service before the convention and 4Pows how this
may have influenced his thinking.
Recent Scholarship and the Federalist. Most
of the more recent scholarship relating to the
intellectual origins of the Federalist falls in the
same two categories created by the earlier work
done by Beard and Adair. Those who believe the
Federalist is an expression of self- or chissmterest must relegate the papers to the class of
propaganda. And those who accept the Federalist
as having some intellectual base, whatever that
base might be, believe that the papers are the
interpretation of the philosophical base in an
attempt to fit it to the American situation.
Conclusion
Martin Diamond, in his essay Ethics and
Politics:
The American Way, after discussing
Aristotle's views on politics and ethics, asks
how

might Aristotle rank America?
he characterize it as a genuine
political community, one with its own
special moral foundation, or only as "an
association of place and of not acting
unjustly to one another for the sake of
trade"? Would he find it a place where
law
was
only
"a
compact, . . . a
guarantor for one another of the just
things, but not able to make the
citizens g-ood and just,"--that is, good
Wo~ld
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and just in the way their characters
were formed and not merely in conformity to a compact? Or might he conclude that there is an American political
ethos, a unique character-forming mix
of ethics and politics?
In short, is
there an "American way" by which this
republic nurtures in its citizens certain
ethical excellences upon the basis of
some particular ~~w of what is adv_a ntageous and just?

This is a key issue arising between the two
schools of thought discussed in this report. Was
America founded upon a unique "political ethos"
created by the framers, or was it founded upon
"an association of place and not acting unjustly to
one another for the sake of trade."
If the framers were motivated by the desire
to enrich themselves, and thus founded the
American republic with this objective in mind,
then America is without moral foundation as a
nation.
"If the framers were motivated by the
desire to create a nation which would remember
them as being worthy of fame, then they may or
may not have succeeded in creating a nation
founded upon a genuine "political ethos."
A second key issue arises from the fact that
the two arguments themselves are fundament8lly
different. Beard's form of economic determinism
has material self-interest controlling America's
founding, and Adair's fame argument sees the
framers as reacting to a variety of forces but
ultimately in control of the founding.
Thus,
Beard sees the interests ultimately controlling the
individuals, and Adair sees the individuals
ultimately controlling the interests.
Beard also
sees the creation of the Constitution, in its
particular form, as inevitable given the particular
economic conditions of the times. Adair sees the
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creation of the Constitution as largely the product
of the framers' desire for fame and as the result
of the Scottish-influenced intellectual development
of the key framers.
A Final Analysis
Each of these theories is based on the view
of man held by the individual scholar who
authored the theory.
Thus, the two primary
arguments discussed in this report proceed from
completely
different
fundamental
premises:
Beard's premise is that the forces within society
are more powerful than the individual. Adair's
premise is that individuals choose to respond to
the forces within society; therefore, individuals
are more powerful than the forces.
Adair sees
material self-interest, which Beard views as the
most powerful force upon man, as being less
important to the framers than their desire for
fame and the intellectual power of Scottish
philosophy and the lessons of history.
Adair
argues that understanding the intellects of the
men who made the decisions concerning the founding of America and the writing of the Federalist,
is the key to understanding the founding of the
United States. In opposition to Adair's assertion,
Beard argues that understanding the economic
status of society at the time of the Constitutional
Convention is the key to understanding America's
founding and the Federalist authors' arguments.
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THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SCANDAL
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
George C. Landrith*
Congressional elections are affected by many
factors, such as incumbency, personal appeal,
issues, party affiliation and scandals. These are
not the only factors influencing Congressional
elections, but they are among the most important.
Possibly the least understood of these factors is
scandal.
Because very little is known or
published about how scandals affect Congressional
elections, I became interested in this topic.
Since scandals occur relatively seldom in
Congressional elections, they do not often play a
major role in the electoral outcome.
When
scandals
do
occur,
however,
and
become
publicized, they are bound to have some type of
effect on the election. Keeping this in mind, my
research question became, "What are the political
consequences
of
scandals
in
Congressional
elections?"
In order to answer this question, I had to
do original research since I found very little
published information.
First, I formulated a
1
questionnaire and a cover letter.
The cover
letter was used to generally explain and introduce
my
topic to the
respondents
while
the
questionnaire was used to gather information upon
*George is a senior majoring in Political
Science. He will be attending law school at the
University of Virginia this fall. George completed
an internship in the office of U.S. Representative
Frank R. Wolf CR-Virginia).
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which I could base my study. Second, I m::iiled
the cover letter ~nd questionnaire to about thirty
different people.
These people included opponents
of
former
Congressmen
involved
in
scandals, newspaper writers, political pollsters,
state party leaders , and the heads of n::itional
Congressional Election Committees. Third, I later
telephoned the people to whom I had written ,
hoping to interview them . After several \41eeks of
telephoning , I had interviewed only sixteen of the
thirty. Many of the respondents were either too
busy or were uncomfortable with the topic since it
was an election year and scandals are a touchy
subject at such times.
Through these sixteen interviews, however,
I was able to collect and compile some rather
interesting information.
In order to answer my
research question, "What are the political consequences of scandals in Congressional elections ?" I
had to break the topic down into the following
sub-questions.
1)

How do voters , campaign contributors,
and the media rank different scandals
in terms of seriousness?

2)

Do certain regional areas view any type
of scandal either more or less seriously
than the nation as a whole?

3)

How does the timing of a scandal, in
relation to election day, affect the
media, the voters , and the campaign
contributors?

4)

What makes a scandal so serious?

5)

How do candidates, party organizations,
Congress, the media, and opponents
deal with scandals?
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Is there an increase in media attention
to scandals? If so, why?

These sub-questions are taken from the questionnaire that I used in my research.
I will deal
with each sub-question separately. After answering each individual question, I will then correlate
the sub-questions through a conclusion.
Seriousness of Different Scandals
Voters
In an effort to discover which scandals were
of the most concern to voters, I asked the
respondents, "How would you rank the following
scandals in terms of importance to voters using a
zero-to-ten
scale
( 0 = not
at
all
serious,
10 = very serious)?" I then listed six categories
of scandals:
heterosexual promiscuity, graft,
homosexuality, misuse of funds, drugs, 1rnd
other. On the average, misuse of funds was the
most serious scandal with an average rating of
8. 2.
Graft and homosexuality were second and
third with a rating of 7. 6 and 7. 4 respectively.
Drugs and heterosexual promiscuity were the least
serious scandals scoring 7. 2 and 5. 2 respectively.
No one ever responded to "other," even though I
specifically mentioned it.
Graph 1 depicts this
information well.
There was a general consensus among the
responde-n ts concerning misuse of funds, graft,
and drugs.
Most of the respondents ranked
these scandals very similarly to the average
ranking. In other words, few respondents gave
rankings that differed significantly from · the
average. The reason for this general consensus
on the misuse of funds, graft, and drugs is that
they are perceived almost universally by voters
as affecting R Congressman's or SenRtor's ability
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Graph 1: Voters' Ranking- of Scandals
(in terms of seriousness)
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to perform as a legislator.
For voters, these
types of scandals are very difficult to rationalize
by saying, "Well, it's just his personal life
style . " The fact is that in our society bribes
and misuse of funds are not usually considered
"personal life styles ."
In comparison , however, homosexuality and
heterosexual promiscuity lacked a consensus.
Some respondents ranked them as eights, nines,
or tens. Others ranked them as zeros, ones, or
twos, and still others ranked them somewhere in
between zero and ten .
The reason for this
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diversity of opinion can be easily explained.
Some
voters
feel
th flt
homosexuality
or
heterosexual promiscuity are personal matters :rnd
do not affect a Congressman's or Senator's performance as a legislator any more than the brand
of facial tissue he uses would. However, other
voters feel that it is unacceptable for a legislator
to be involved in such things because it shows a
lack of moral character which they feel is needed
by our lawmakers. As a result of these widely
divergent viewpoints, the av~rage rankings given
to homosexuality and heterosexual promiscuity
were very different from the individual responses, since the individual responses tended to
be polarized toward either a ranking of ten or
zero.
Campaign Contributors
When the respondents were asked to rank
the importance of different scandals to campaign
contributors,
the result
changed somewhat.
Misuse of funds was still the most significant
scandal, scoring 6. 9.
Graft and homosexuality
tied for the second most significant scandal, each
scoring 6. 5. Drugs followed close behind with a
score of 6. 4.
Lastly, heterosexual promiscuity
was the least significant scandal, averaging only
3. 5. These facts are illustrated most clearly in
Graph 2 .
Once ::igain, there was a basic consensus on
misuse of funds, graft, and drugs. Surprisingly, ther-e was more agreement on the importance
of homosexuality among campaign contributors
than among voters.
While there was still some
disparity on the importance of homosexuality, the
disparity was less polarized than with voters . In
other words, the individual responses were much
closer to the average with the campaign contributors than with the voters.
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Graph 2: Campaign Contributors'
Ranking- of Scandals
(in terms -of seriousness)
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It is interesting to note that campaign contributors
viewed
all
the
scandals
except
heterosexual promiscuity as relatively similar in
their level of seriousness.
Over half of the
respondents agreed on an explanation of this
phenomenon.
First, the campaign contributor
tends to view his or her contribution to a candidate as a "bet" or an "investment ." As a result,
any scandfll that may damage or lessen a candidate's chances for election will likely influence the
contributor's decision on whether or not to support the candidate. Since voters ranked misuse
of funds, graft, homosexuality, and drugs as
relatively serious scandals but did not view
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heterosexual promiscuity as a very serious scandal, it seems logical th flt campaign contributors
with an "investment" or "bet" in mind, view
misuse of funds, graft, homosexuality and drugs
as relatively serious scandals, while they view
heterosexual promiscuity as much less serious.
Media
When the respondents were asked to rank
the several scandals according to the media's view
of seriousness, the results changed once again.
First of all, the three most significant scandals
were misuse of funds, scoring 9. 4, with graft and
drugs closely behind at 9 .1 each.
Following
somewhat more distantly were homosexuality and
heterosexual promiscuity averaging 7. 9 and 7. 6
respectively. Graph 3 illustrates the findings.
A prominent political editor for a large
newspaper said that the media views misuse of
funds, graft, and drugs as similar in relative
seriousness or importance. He stated that these
sorts of scandals are widely believed to affect a
legislator's performance in office and are, therefore,
extremely relevant
news items.
The
scandals involving heterosexual promiscuity or
homosexuality are not as clearly linked to performance in office and, therefore, do not usually get
quite as much attention. The editor did go on to
say, however, that all scandals are relevant to
the media. As a result, all scandals will receive
some media coverage. The difference is that very
serious ·scandals involving the misuse of funds,
graft, and drugs are given more attention and
are treated more negatively than less serious
scandals
like
homosexuality
or
heterosexual
promiscuity.
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Graph 3: Media's Rnnkings of Scandals
(in terms of seriousness)
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Comparison of Voter, Campaign Contributor, and
Media
When comparing the importance of scandals
to voters with their importance to campaign
contributors and the media, two points become
obvious:
1) campaign
contributors
view
all
scandals as substantially less important than both
voters and the media, and 2) the media views
scandals as substantially more important than both
voters and campaign contributors.
The first
point is demonstrated by the fact that campaign
contributors ranked misuse of funds at 6. 9 while
the voters' ranking was 8. 2 and the media ranked
it 9. 4.
Likewise, drugs, homosexuality, and
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heterosexual promiscuity were all ranked as less
important to campaign contributors than to either
voters or the media.
The second point is
demonstrated by the media's ranking g-raft at 9 .1
while voters and campaign contributors ranked it
only 7. 6 and 6. 5 respectively.
Likewise, the
media ranked drugs as 9 .1, but voters felt it was
only 7. 6 and campaign contributors felt it only
merited a 6. 5. Heterosexual promiscuity, misuse
of funds, and homosexuality followed this same
trend.
These two points are illustrated clearly
by Graph 4.
Graph 4: A Comparison of Voters', Campaig-n
Contributors', and the Media's Ranking of Scandals
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As shown in Graph 4, campaign contributors
consistently viewed all the scandals as less
serious than did either voters or the media.
When I asked the respondents why campaign
contributors consider scandals less serious than
do voters or the media, the most frequent answer
was that the campaign contributors view the
candidates and elections as "investments" or
"bets" and as a result, the scandal itself is not
terribly important. What is important is whether
or not a scandal makes a candidate a "poor investment" or a "bad risk." If the scandal makes
the candidate a "poor investment" or a "bad
risk," then the campaign contributor would feel
that the scandal is serious.
However, if the
scandal does not appear to damage the candidate's
chance of victory in the election, then to the
campaign contributor, the scandal is not of great
importance.
A somewhat less skeptical respondent explained that campaign contributors are issue
voters and thus they base their support or
nonsupport of a candidate upon the issues and
not his personal characteristics. Several of the
respondents who offered this explanation felt that
campaign contributors were more politically astute
or aware.
This political awareness allows the
campaign contributors to react less emotionally to
a scandal than the average voter would.
As
Graph 4 clearly shows,
the media
considers all of the scandals more serious than
either the voters or the campaign contributors.
From my research, I was able to derive two
explanations for this: 1) the media sees itself as
a "watchdog" of government and fulfilling this
role of "watchdog" requires the media to view
scandals very seriously, and 2) scandals are
interesting news; thus, scandals sell newspapers.
I will briefly touch upon these two explanations.
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First of fill, the "watchdog" role of the media
means that the media exposes or gives attention
to scandHls because the media feels that it has a
responsibility to present the facts to the public.
One point that I want to make clear is that the
personal opinions of the members of the media
about scandals did not seem to differ significantly
from those of any of the other groups of people I
interviewed.
However,
because
of
their
professional responsibility to be "watchdogs," the
members of the media feel an obligation or duty to
present the facts about the scandals even if they
personally think it is trivial.
Thus, the media
ranks almost all scandals as relatively serious
because it feels that the public has the right to
decide what is trivial and what is important. I
think
that
this
"watchdog"
explanation
is
reasonable; however, it is only part of the
answer.
The second explanation states that scandals
sell papers or improve ratings; therefore, the
media focuses in on scandals. This view is more
cynical, but it has some truth to it. · It has been
said that when a dog bites a m:rn, it is not news,
but when a man bites a dog, it is news. This
saying is analogous to scandals and the news.
For example, there are thousands of homosexuals
in the United States; yet, in recent months,
Representative
Studds
CD-Massachusetts)
has
received a lot of attention in the press while few
other homosexuals are ever featured in the
headlines.
In short, when elected officials are
involved· in "questionable" activities or scandals,
the public is interested and people buy the paper
and watch the news that tells all of the details of
the
scandal.
Once
again ,
however,
this
explanation is only partly useful because other
factors mHy be involved.
Another very important factor will be
covered in a later section of this paper entitled
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"Greater Media Attention." In this section I will
give a third explanation of why the media ranks
all scandals more seriously than voters or
campaign contributors.
Regional Differences
In order to determine if the serious_ness of
scandals varied throughout the United States by
region, I asked, "Are there some parts of the
country that may consider one or more of these
scandals either less or more serious than the
nation as a whole?" Every respondent felt that
there was a great deal of variance within the
country.
First of all, it was generally believed that all
five scandals (misuse of funds, graft , homosexuality , drugs, and heterosexual promiscuity)
are viewed as more serious in three major areas:
1) rural areas such as the Midwest, 2) the South,
and 3) highly religious areas such as the Bible
Belt and Utah.
I realize that these three categories can be overlapped. For example, much of
the South is rural and much of the South is
considered a part of the Bible Belt. However ,
even though these three categories overlap , they
are not necessarily redundant.
For example,
Richmond, Virginia, or Atlanta, Georgia, are
Southern, nonrural cities, but they were believed
by the respondents to view all of the scandals as
more serious than most cities in the Northeast. I
will offer explanations as to why these three
areas might consider the scandals more serious
than the nation as a whole.
First, rural areas, such as the Midwest or
parts of the South, might consider scandals to be
more serious than the - nation as a whole because
rural areas tend to be more homogeneous.
By
definition, a homogeneous society's population is
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relatively uniform or similar in its characteristics.
This means the people ::ire educated similarly,
hold similar opinions, have similar social and
economic backgrounds, etc. This lack of diversity in a homog-eneous society can lead to intolerance toward people and toward ideas that are
different or unfamiliar. As a result of this lack
of tolerance, scandals can be viewed very seriously in a homogeneous society.
Parts of the
Midwest and the South could be considered relatively homogeneous, thus accounting partially for
scandals being- seen as serious in these areas.
Second, the South might consider these
scandals more serious because it tends to be a
more traditional society. The rules produced by
a traditional society are rules that have been
passed from generation to generation and continued for so long that they almost carry the
force of law. Since the rules have been in force
for a Ione: period of time, they are likely to be
morally conservative rules or rules that may be
considered "old fashioned" in today's society.
When these rules are broken the offense is not
taken lightly or quickly forgotten. In contrast, a
more modern society (or at least a nontraditional
one) seems to have fewer and less strict rules for
members of society.
Since a traditional society
has more strict rules than a modern society, it is
not too difficult to understand why an area such
as the South--which tends to be traditional--may
view scandals more seriously.
Thfrd, the highly religious areas like Utah
may view the scandals more seriously because
scandals violate moral codes that are considered
important in almost all religions.
For example,
heterosexual promiscuity would be very serious in
Utah, as former Congressman Howe CD-Utah),
who attempted to solicit two prostitutes on the
day after he had won the Democratic primary,
could attest. Conversely, the same scandal may
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not be very serious at all in New York City
where it may not be an unusual happening and
where those who practice religion are not as
highly concentrated.
In short, a scandal in a
highly religious area would be interpreted by
voters as a sign of moral weakness and
compromising standards , which is not usually
tolerable to the very religious. Another factor to
be considered in religious areas is that they tend
to be more traditional and more homogeneous than
areas which are not noted as "religious regions."
On the other hand, various scandals were
perceived to be less serious in large cities and
Northeast. Scandals such as graft or misuse of
funds are less serious in large unionized cities
like Chicago or Pittsburg. In New York, Boston,
and San Francisco, homosexuality is less serious.
Likewise, drugs are less serious in New York and
California .
Finally , heterosexual promiscuity is
less serious in almost all large cities, in the
Northeast, and in California.
These scandals are considered to be less
serious in the large cities and the Northeast
because they are more common there. For example, in a unionized town with big business, graft
is perceived to be more common and therefore it
is
less
shocking
or
serious.
Likewise,
homosexuality is more common in New York and
San Francisco than in other areas; thus, it is not
viewed as seriously.
In short , when a scandal
occurs more frequently , its impact and seriousness are lessened.
Another factor is that the
Northeast, large cities, and California are very
heterogeneous.
Diversity is extreme in these
areas . The people in these areas are willing to
accept differences, including scandal. This does
not mean that they are amoral. It simply means
that they are more tolerant of politicians who are
involved in scandals.
In short, heterogeneity
encourages more tolerance, thus explaining why
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sc~rndals are viewed less seriously or more tolerantly in
the
Northeast,
large cities,
and
California.

Timing of Scandal
My next goal was to determine if the timing
of a scandal in relation to the election affects its
importance to the following groups of people:
1) voters, 2) campaign contributors, 3) opponents
of the scandalous candidates, and 4) the media.
While the timing of a scandal impacts all four of
these groups, the timing has various effects on
each of them.
Voters
The closer a scandal is to the election, the
more seriously it is viewed by the voters.
In
other words, a scandal that occurs a few weeks
before the election is more damaging to a candidate than a scandal that occurs many months
before the election. When a scandal occurs right
before an election, it is difficult for the candidate
to rebound from it. There is little time for the
"scandalous" candidate to establish his innocence
or to redeem his character. Likewise, a scandal
that happens close to an election gets more coverage (mostly negative) than one that occurs a year
or two before elections.
A second reason scandals that occur close to
elections· are considered more serious by voters is
the short memory of voters. One leader of the
Democratic party said that voters, on the whole,
have a limited ability to remember scandals after
six months. He referred to this as a "six-month
window." There was a general consensus among
the respondents that the voters tend to forget or
maybe even forgive after enough time has passed.
As R result, if a scandal must hit, the best time
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would be the December or January right after the
election.
This would give Congressmen and
Senators about two to six years r-e spectively to
prove that they are capable legislators despite the
scandal, or give the voters enough time to forget.
Campaign Contributors
The campaign contributors are less affected
by the timing of a scandal but they are affected
nonetheless. If the scandal occurs close to the
election, the candidate already has the contributor's money; thus, in one sense, a scandal late in
a candidate's campaign theoretically should not
drastically hurt his fund raising.
However, it
could hurt support for subsequent reelection
efforts, so a scandal should never be taken
lightly. Perhaps more important, however, is the
fact that the campaign contributors ranked all
five
scandals,
from
misuse
of
funds
to
heterosexual promiscuity, as less serious than the
voters and the media ranked them. This would
seem to indicate that a scandal may not affect a
campaign contributor's support nearly as much as
it would erode voter support.
As explained
earlier, campaign contributors look at their con tributions as "investments . " Secondly, campaign
contributors could be more issue conscious and
less interested in scandals. For these reasons,
campaign contributors are the least affected by
the timing of a scandal.
Opponents
One man's loss is another man's gain. For
this reason, the political opponent of a scandalous
candidate is bound to benefit from his opponent's
scandal.
The more serious the scandal or the
closer it occurs to election day, the better it is
for the opponent. A scandal that occurs a year
or more before elections may have only a small
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benefit for the opponent. The longer time period
allows voters to either forgive or forget while
allowing the candidate to prove his capabilities as
a legislator.
Media
The media's reaction to the timing of a
scandal surfaces almost exclusively in the amount
of attention given to it. For example, a scandal
that occurs two weeks before an election will be a
big news item until after the election .
This
means that the scandal will be front-page news
for over two weeks. However, if the same scandal occurred over a year before the election, it
would die down after a few days. Even if the
scandal remained a news item for a couple of
weeks, it would not be the "top story." this
means that a scandal occurring long before
election time will not be in the news as long, nor
will it get the top billing as long nor be treated
as negatively as a scandal occurring near an
election.
In short, an election-time scandal is
played up and given special attention by the
media, whereas the nonelection-time scandal gets
relatively little exposure.
Seriousness of the Act
My next goal was to find out what aspect of
a scandal makes it so serious.
I particularly
wanted to know if voters and cR.mpaign contributors differed in what made a scandalous act
serious.
There was no particular answer that
was given most frequently by either voters or
campaign contributors.
When the informR.tion
gathered from this question is examined in conjunction with the other information that I obtained
from my questionnaire, I feel that I can offer
some good explanations to answer the question:
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What makes a "scandalous" act so serious to the
voters and campaign contributors?
Voters
All of my interviews indicated to some extent
that there are so many different factors that
could explain why a scandalous act is serious that
it would be difficult to pinpoint one specific item .
Nevertheless, one theme seemed to be basic to all
of the responses. What makes scandals so serious
to voters is that they feel as though their trust
was betrayed.
As a political editor for a
newspaper in Virginia explained, voters elect a
representative that they think they can trust.
Many times a scandal serves to tell voters, "See ,
you cannot trust him." The reason voters feel
that their trust has been betrayed is that a
candidate usually tries to create an image of
honesty, integrity, and competence.
But when
voters see scandals, they begin to question the
candidate's image of honesty and integrity .
Voters feel as though their trust was taken
advantage of by the "scandalous" candidate.
In other cases, scandals cause voters to feel
that candidates have grossly misrepresen t ed
themselves.
For example , if a candidate cam paigns on values such as family, preservation of
the morals of society, etc. , t he voters expect the
candidate to live a life that is in keeping with his
campaign ideals. If a candidate is involved in a
scandal
like
heterosexual
promiscuity
or
homosexuality, the voters feel the candidate is a
hypocrite and that he grossly misr epresented
himself.
The scandal involving Representative
Robert Bauman CR-Maryland) illustrates this point
vividly. He presented himself as a strong conservative against homosexuality and all other
"vices of our liberal society."
Then he was
caught involved in a homosexual act on Capitol
Hill.
This made him look hypocritical and
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ents.
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Because he g-rossly misrepresented his
he lost the support of his constitu-

Another factor that helps explain what makes
a scandnl so serious was given by Patrick Shea
when he said th~t a scandal "rips at the moral
fiber" of society.
The voters many times feel as
though their values are being attacked by the
scandal.
This attitude makes voters defensive
:rnd feel as though they must protect the "moral
fiber" of society by voting out the candidate
involved in the scandal.
The feelings of betrayed trust, hypocrisy,
gross misrepresentation of character, and the
"ripping of the moral fiber" of society were all
central themes in explaining what makes a scandal
so serious to voters.
Campaign Contributors
The campaign contributors vary only slightly
from the voters in this aspect.
As I already
explained, campaign contributors do not view
scandals as seriously as voters. However, to the
degree that campaign contributors do view
scandals as serious, one may say that the abovementioned betrayed trust,
hypocrisy,
gross
misrepresentation of character, and the "ripping
of the moral fiber" of society are all important
factors.
However, for campaign contributors another
important factor in explaining what makes a
scandal so serious stems again from the idea that
a contribution is viewed as an "investment." for
campaign contributors, a scandalous act becomes
more serious when it hurts the candidate's chance
for reelection.
In other words, if the voters
seem to be outraged by the scandal then campaign
contributors also worry more about it because
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their "investment" may not work out.
On the
other hand, when voters seem to be relatively
unaffected by a sc:rndal, then the contributors
feel like their investment is safe; thus, the
contributor is less troubled by the scandal.
Jail Sentence
The second part of this question asked if a
jail sentence made a scandal even more damaging.
The universal answer was "yes."
Richard
Ciccone described a jail sentence as "the kiss of
4
death."
The main reason the jail sentence is so
serious is that the accusation of scandal is no
longer alleged-- it's final.
A conviction and jail
sentence leaves no room for doubt of guilt in the
minds of the voters .
In addition, the media
coverage of a jail sentence is not likely to boost
any candidate's career.
How Groups Deal with Scandal
Candidate
When talking with respondents, I found that
candidates can react to accusations of scandals in
two ways : 1) they can deny any guilt or in volvement, or 2) they can ::idmit involvement or
guilt.
There are many variables that dictate
which Rpproach would be most advantageous to
the candidate. Some of these include the type of
scandal, the candidate's district , the candidate's
popularity , the candidate's representation of his
district , etc.
I was told by one man on Capitol Hill that if
a candidate has deniability, he should deny a
scandal (deniability means that the candidate was
not caught "red-handed" and that there is some
doubt as to his guilt) .
The Capitol Hill aide
reasoned that strong supporters would believe the
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accused candidate was innocent if he claimed to
be innocent.
For example, many Americans
refused to believe Richard Nixon had anything to
do with the Watergate cover-up because he
claimed innocence.
(However, after Nixon had
lost his "deniabili ty," few believed his claim to
innocence.)
Therefore, if the candidate has
"deniability," he should deny involvement in the
scandal.
By denying it, the candidate may
convince many voters that he is innocent.
However, when 11 deniability 11 does not exist
and the question of guilt or involvement is not
very debatable, most respondents agreed that
admitting guilt was the best tactic. By admitting
guilt and expressing regret, a candidate can
quiet the media and the opposition quickly. For
example, if a Congressman admits guilt and
expresses sorrow, the scandal will be in the
headlines only briefly and will be looked upon
more tolerably. But if the Congressman denies
guilt when it seems obvious that he is guilty, the
media will keep the story in the headlines for a
much greater length of time, and will treat the
scandal more negatively.
Admitting guilt is particularly effective when
the scandal is a personal problem such as
heterosexual promiscuity or alcoholism.
By
admitting it and expressing sorrow, the voters
feel the candidate had a problem or made a mistake , but should be forgiven.
Likewise, the
media and the opposition cannot play up the
scandal ·after admission of guilt and expression of
remorse because they do not want to appear cruel
or as if they are trying to capitalize on the
scandal. Therefore, admitting guilt and expressing remorse is a good way to quiet the opposition
and the media. A good example of this is Representative Daniel Crane CR-Illinois). He admitted and expressed sorrow for his 11 affair," and he
recently won renomination within his party.
I
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was told by several people in the media covering
Capitol Hill that Crane is no longer receiving
"bad press." As far as the media is concerned,
the situation has basically blown over.
Party Organization
The party organization's main gmil is to win
elections.
The same thing is true of a party
organization whose candidate was involved in a
scandal. If the party thinks that their candidate
who was involved in a scandal will lose, and if
the party thinks it can find another candidate
who has a better chance to win, the party organization will likely support the new candidate
hoping he will win. Furthermore, as Patrick Shea
pointed out, when the scandal is hurting the
party, the party will try to isolate the scandal
and its complications from the party in order to
protect itself from the scandalous image .
Nevertheless, if the local party organization
cannot field a better candidate, it will stick with
the current one even if he is accused of scandal.
While there may be some dissent, chances are that
most of the party will support the accused candidate if there is no better choice . If the candidate has been a good representative of his district's interests and is seen by the local party
organization as having "brought home the bacon , "
the accused candidate will likely receive support
from the local party despite his "scandalous"
image.
Congress
The Congress as a whole has two theories
about how to deal with scandals: 1) disassociate
Congress with the scandal by taking punitive
action, or 2) ignore the scandal, thus showing
the ability to deal with scandal. Generally, the
first method of taking punitive action is used for

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

129

the more serious scandals.
Conversely, the
ignoring method is used for the more "trivial" or
personal scandals like alcoholism and heterosexual
promiscuity.
There is an underlying- theme to both the
punitive and ignoring methods:
the institution
comes first, the individual second.
In other
words, the Congress feels a need to protect
itself, or more accurately its image, from the
effects of scandals.
This means that Congress'
reaction to a scandal is larg-ely determined by
what action Congress feels it must take to protect
itself.
When the scandal deals with alcoholism or
heterosexual promiscuity and the member of
Congress has Admitted and expressed remorse for
it, Congress will not be likely to do anything. If
Congress were to take action, it would appear too
rigid, heavy-handed, and old fashioned. This is
an image that, by and large, Congress does not
want.
On the other hand, when the scandal is very
serious, as with the misuse of funds, Congress is
more likely to take punitive action.
Congress
wants to let the public know that it does not
condone such "dishonesty and corruption in
government." If Congress does nothing about a
highly publicized, serious scandal, it runs the
risk of looking too lax and insensitive to the need
of good, honest government. A lax and insensitive image is one that Congress does not want.
The party leadership in Congress protects
the party first and the candidate second.
For
example, when the leadership of a party feels
that its candidate has little chance for victory
because of a scandal, the leadership will ask him
to resign or not to run for office. The leadership's main concern is holding on to that seat in
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Congress. Their secondary concern is with the
candidate himself. In short, the parties are most
concerned with retaining power.
It is difficult to describe exactly how Congress deals with scandal because Congress is
really a collection of 535 very different and
independent people. As a result, it is difficult to
give hard and fast rules that are used on Capitol
Hill.
This is especially true when dealfog with
scandals because of the many factors that make
scandals either serious or not serious . In short,
the information that I have provided about how
Congress deals with scandal is by necessity
relatively general. But it is accurate to say that
as Congress protects itself first,
and the
individual second, likewise, parties protect their
power first, and the individual's second.

Media
The media has a definite interest in publicizing a scandal and making it a headline. First of
all, scandals sell papers.
Secondly, the press
feels the need to be a "watchdog" over the government.
While the media will tend to print almost all
"scandalous" events, it does have the freedom or
discretion to print or not print a story.
The
media does not withhold scandals from the public
because there is no real motivation to do so. The
media stands to lose nothing by publicizing
scandals and stRnds to gain notoriety and influence by publishing them ; thus , the media almost
always publicizes scandals .
Opponents of "Scandalous" Candidates
The opponents of the candidate accused of
scandal would like nothing better than media
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coverage of the scandal, so the opponent must be
tactful in his effort to see a scandal work to his
::i.dvantage.
For example, if one candidate is
::iccused of graft, his opponent would not be wise
to constantly call him a crook or dishonest. A
much more effective method would be subtlety.
Playing up the theme of honesty ::i.nd integrity
would be effective because the candidate would
never actually mention the scandal but listeners
would almost automatically think of the dishonesty
of the other candidate.
This subtle method of bringing a scandal to
the voters' minds is A very effective way to make
political gain out of a scandal. For example, if
the opponent were to constantly announce in
public the scandalous candidate's promiscuous
behavior, many voters would feel like the opponent was picking on the "scandalous" candidate.
If the voters feel like the opponent is picking on
the other candidate, they will think the opponent
is petty. When this happens, the scandal backfires and actually hurts the innocent candidate
and helps the "scandalous" candidate.
The
danger of looking petty when playing up a
scandal is particularly acute when the scandals
are more personal in nature, such as alcoholism,
heterosexual promiscuity, and, in some areas,
homosexuality. To avoid looking petty, but still
play up the scandal, the opponent should portray
himself as a good, honest family man, being seen
with his wife and children frequently.
This
would subtly remind voters that he is a man that
would never by involved in such scandals. At
the same time, he avoids the blacklash effect that
can be caused by picking on the other candidate.
More Media Attention
When I asked if there hHd been e;reater
media attention to scandals in the past ten years,
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I received a few nos, but the large majority said,
"yes" ( 13 out of 15 said media attention to
scandals had increased).
The few respondents
who answered "no" felt like the media attention to
scandals had remained about constant during the
past ten years.
However, the majority felt that media attention had increased. When asked why th_e media
had increased its coverage of scandals, most
respondents said, "Watergate." Other less fre quently named reasons were 1) new campaign
disclosure laws, and 2) the Vietnam War.
Watergate has made the public irnd the media
more skeptical of our government and our leaders .
Likewise, the rags-to-riches story, or at
least the fame of Woodward and Bernstein, made
investigative
reporting
more
popular .
Mr.
Ciccone, the political editor of the Chicago
Tribune, ssiid that "everybody wants to be a
Woodstein."
This may account for the added
attention that scandals receive in the media.
The more strict campaign disclosure laws
show the distrust that Watergate generated among
the public. Furthermore , they make it easier to
find a possible scandal. Therefore, scandals are
easier to expose now than they were before
Watergate.
Vietnam was cited because it showed the
American public the terrible things the government would do for the sake of saving face . (In
the late sixties the goals of the war changed
drastically until the primary objective had become
saving America from embarrassment rather than
attaining freedom for the Vietnamese.)
As a
result, the Vietnam War bred distrust and contempt for the government.
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Several newspaper writers said that in the
past, the personal lives of politicians were not
publicized.
They pointed to the fact that
Franklin D. Roosevelt was not shown in a wheelchair hy the media while in office. While being in
a wheelchair is hRrdly scandalous, it shows that
personal things were not publicized. It was told
by several respondents that the media, by and
large, was well aware of John F. Kennedy's
affairs and yet they did not make an issue of it
because it was a personal matter. Whether or not
these stories of scandal about Kennedy are true
is not important.
They serve to illustrate that
even though the press thought the scandalous
stories were true, they did not print them.
Today personal things are publicized almost
indiscriminately.
For example, Representatives
Crane and Howe saw that "personal" scandals
were publicized. This shows a basic change in
the attitude of the media toward personal
scandals.
An interesting paradox arises when we
consider the fact that in the past, people were
probably less tolerant of all types of scandals,
yet the press only publicized the scandals that
dealt directly with performance.
Today, when
the public is generally more tolerant of scandals
(at least ones like heterosexw:1l promiscuity,
homosexuality, and alcoholism), the press will
publicize any scandal, even a fairly trivial one
like former Senator Birch Bayh's (D-Indfana)
mishap with the franking privilege.
This new
treatment of scandals by the media creates a
paradox in that years ago, in a more "conservative society," the press wR.s more tolerant of
scandals while today, in a society that is more
open and uninhibited, the press is rather "intolerant" of scandals.
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Conclusion

In my conclusion, I will try to bring together the main points which this study has led me to
discover. Everything I learned seemed to center
around the idea that there are so many different
variables involved in scandals that it is difficult
to predict their exact effect. One could say that
scandals are like snowflakes--no two are _exactly
alike.
Some scandals can actually help a candidate.
For example, several of the respondents told me
that
Representative
Gerry
Studds
CD-Massachusetts)
has
benefited
from
his
homosexuality scandal. His constituency is very
liberal and are not bothered by homosexuality.
But more importantly, it gave Gerry Studds the
image of being his own man, not just following
along.
That image is believed to have helped
Representative Studd's popularity.
In another
example, George Hansen of Idaho has been involved in tax scandals more than once, but
several respondents claimed that it was helping
Hansen.
He has written a book about how the
"Eastern bureaucracy and liberals" are trying to
damage his professional reputation.
This has
given him the image of a hero fighting an almost
unbeatable "monster" represented by the govern ment and the Internal Revenue Service.
On the other hand, scandals can be and
usually are damaging. Too many candidates have
lost elections as a result of a scandal to say that
scandals do not hurt a candidate.
Take for
example Bauman of Maryland; when his scandal
became publicized, reelection was out of the
question. Perhaps the only question was whether
he could avoid spending time behind bars.
Likewise with Hinson of Mississippi and Howe of
Utah; scandals were "the beginning of the end"
of their political careers.
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While scandals as a general rule are dami:iging to election goals, they can in some circumstances actually help or have a neutral effect.
There Are so many variables involved in what
effect a scandal will have that truly accurate
information is difficult to accumulate. Therefore,
while my findings could not be used to predict
the political consequences of every scandal, they
are useful as a general guide in understanding
the consequences of scandals. These effects can
best be summarized by pointing out the following.
1)

Voters ranked misuse of funds, graft,
drug abuse,
and homosexuality as
relatively serious while heterosexual
promiscuity is perceived as less serious.

2)

Campaign
contributors
ranked
all
scandals as substantially less important
than voters or the media.

3)

The media ranked all scandals as substantially more important than voters or
campaign contributors.

4)

When ranking- scandals, regional differences become apparent.
The South,
the Midwest, rural areas, and highly
religious areas viewed scandals more
seriously.
On the other hand, the
Northeast, large urban areas,
and
California viewed scandals, especially
personal scandals, less seriously.

5)

The timing of a scandal does affect
voters because they have a tendency to
forget or forgive.
Thus, a scandal
right before an election is more serious.
Likewise, a scandal rig-ht before an
election gets more media attention and
more negative attention.
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6)

The breach of trust and hypocrisy make
scandals serious to voters.
Also, the
negative reaction of voters to scandals
makes scandals serious to campaign
contributors.

7)

Candidates can either deny guilt or
admit guilt and express remorse for it.
By admitting- guilt and expressing
remorse, a candidate can quiet the
opposition and the media.

8)

District party organizations' main concern is winning the election, so that
goal largely determines how the district
deals with a scandal.

9)

The Congress's main concern is protecting the institution.
Likewise,
the
Republican and Democratic parties' main
concern is maintaining or increasing
their power. Thus, a candidate who is
likely to lose as a result of a scandal
will be encouraged to withdraw.

10)

The media has given more attention to
scandals because of Watergate, which
created a general distrust of government and politicians .
Watergate also
increased the number of investigative
reporters.

These ten points, when considered together,
provide an answer to the question, "What are the
political consequences of scandal in Congressional
elections?" If the answer to this question seems
to be complex and influenced by many factors,
then I have accurately presented the findings of
my research. It may be interesting to see how
well these ten points explain the political consequences of scandals in the upcoming Congressional elections .
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APPENDIX
Item #1:

Cover Letter
Date

Dear
I am presently taking a course from Dr.
David Magleby on Congress at Brigham Young
University in Provo, Utah. For my term paper in
this class, I would like to analyze the political
consequences of "scandal" in Congressional Campaigns. As you know, there has been a seeming
1ncrease in scandals, such as: graft (Abscam),
homosexuality,
heterosexual promiscuity,
etc.
Despite the importance of this topic, I can find
no published scholarly information that will help
me in studying the effects of scandals in Congressional elections.
As a
(position)
, you have seen the
consequences of scandals and know how they have
been dealt with. Your knowledge would help me
greatly in my research.
I realize your time is
limited and valuable.
Keeping this in mind, I
would like to telephone you in about a week to
hold a brief ( 10-12 minute) phone interview. I
h ave enclosed the questionnaire that I will use
during our interview, so that you will be familiar
with my research topic.
I appreciate your time and expertise in
helping me with this research project.
If you
would like, I would be happy to send you the
results of my research upon its completion. Once
again, thank you for your time.
Sincerely,
George C. Landrith
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Item #2:

1.

Questionnaire

How would you rank the following scandals
in terms of importance to voters, Campaign
Contributors, and the media?
(Ranking:
0 = Not at all serious, 10 = Very serious.)
Heterosexual
Promiscuity

Graft
(Abscam)

Homosexuality

Voters
Campaign
Contributors
Media
Misuse
of
Funds
Voters
Campaign
Contributors
Media

Drugs

Other
(Specify)
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Are there some parts of the country that
may
con sider
one
or
more
of these
"scandals," either less or more serious than
the nation on the whole?
Heterosexual Promiscuity
Graft (Abscam)
Homosexuality
Misuse of Funds
Drugs
Other (specify)
Why?
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3.

Does the timing of a scandal effect its
importance and/or affect the media?
(Ex:
right before election or 1-1/2 years before
election for a Congressman and 4-5 years for
a Senator?)
a.

to the voters ?

b.

to campai gn contributors?

c.

to "scandalous candidates"' opponents?
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4.

R..

What makes the "scandalous" act so
serious to the voters and campaign
contributors?
The act
itself?

The
circumstances?

Voters
Campaign
Contributors
The other
p::1rty involved

Other?
(specify)

Voters
Campaii.sn
Contributors
b.

Does a jail sentence make the "scandal"
even more damaging? Why?
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5.

How do the following people handle or deal
with scandal?
Some may exploit it while
others may down-play it. How is this done?
Scandal
Heterosexual
Promiscuity

Graft
(Abscam)

Homosexuality

Actors
Candidates
Party:
A) Districts
B)

Congress
as a whole

Media
Misuse
of
Funds
Actors
Candidates
Party:
A) Districts
B) Congress
as a whole
Media

Drugs

Other
(Specify)
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Opponents
6.

In the past ten years has there been greater
media attention to scandals? Why?

Thank You!
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Item #3:

Mailing- List

I wrote letters and sent questionnaires to
the following people.
(The "X" after the name
indicates that either they responded personally or
someone in their office responded.)
National Congressional Election Committee :
X

Atwood, Brian .
paign Committee

Democratic Senatorial Cam-

Daniels, Mitch.
torial Committee

National Republican

Sena-

X

David,
Marta.
Democratic
Campaign Committee

Congressional

X

Franks, Martin.
Democratic
Campaign Committee

Congressional

X

Vander Jagt, Guy.
National
Congressional Committee

Republican

State Party Leaders:
Aker low, Charles.
Atkins,
Party

Chester.

x
x

Colley, Michael.

X

Shea, Patrick.

Massachusetts Democratic
Ohio Republican Party

Natfios, Andrew.
Party

Tipps, Paul.

Utah Republican Party

Massachusetts Republican

Utah Democratic Party
Ohio Democratic Party

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

145

Pollsters:
Hamilton, William
Hart, Peter
X

Jones, Dan
Lawrence, Gary
Tarrence, Lance

X

Teeter, Robert

Media:
X

Ciccone, Richard.
Times

Political Editor, Chicago

Broder, David.
Post

Political Editor, Washington

x

Eisman , Dale.
Times-Dispatch

Political

x

Endicott,
William.
Angeles Times
Nourse, Dick.

X

Editor,

Political

Richmond

Editor,

Los

Anchorman, KSL News

Parker, Douglas.
City Tribune

Political Editor, Salt Lake

Webb,
News

Political

Lavarr.

Editor,

Deseret

Opponents:
X

Appelgate, Douglas.
Dowdy, Wayne.

Ohio (Representative)

Mississippi (Representative)
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Dyson, Roy.

Maryland (Representative)

Foglietto, Thomas (Representative)
X

Mariott, Dan.

Utah (Representative)

Quayle , Dan.

Indiana (Senator)
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ENDNOTES
1

The cover letter and questionnaire can be
found in the Appendix.
2

For
a
list
of those
to
whom
the
questionnaire was mailed, see Appendix, Item #3 .

.,

"Interview with Patrick Shea, 27 February
1984.
4

Interview
27 February 1984.
5

Ibid.

with

Richard

Ciccone,
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NATO:
THE U.S. COMMITMENT+
Spencer Tall*
Introduction
In the closing phase of the Second World
War, seven weeks after the capitulation of Nazi
Germany and six weeks before the Hiroshima
bomb, representatives of fifty nations signed the
United Nations Charter in San Francisco.
The
date was June 26, 1945, and the world hoped that
it had at last learned how to keep the peace.
Within
four years,
however,
ten
European
countries found themselves faced by a threat, the
nature of which necessitated some more specific
protection than that afforded by the United
Nations
Charter.
Exercising the
right
of
individual or collective self-defense (under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter), the Europeans
turned to the United States and Canada to
underwrite their pledge of mutual security and,
on Ap11_1 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was
signed.
U.S. relations with its major allies, the
NATO countries, have in recent years been
+The
author
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particularly troubled by differences over what
constitutes an appropriate sharing of the burdens
and benefits of alliance.
The United States
initially discouraged its European allies from
heavy spending on defense so that they might
concentrate on economic recovery instead. In the
last twenty-five years, however, the economic
growth of the United States has not kept pace
with that of its major allies. At the same time
global and military responsibilities of the- United
States have grown while the Europeans have
pulled back from global military involvement.
Many Americans believe that although our defense
efforts are vitally important to our own security,
they also contribute a major share of the physical
security enjoyed by our NATO allies.
Such
discrepancies in defense burden sharing- were
accepted when the Europeans were involved in
massive post-war reconstruction efforts and were
economically unsteady.
But now there is a
question as to whether the allies have become too
dependent on the United States militarily, while
reaping the advantages of the strong economies
that have benefited from the United States'
security efforts.
It seems that a lot of the burden sharing
problem is inherent in the structure of the alliance systems that the United States developed
following the Second World War. During this time
the focus of U.S. policy was not a build-up of
European national forces.
Then Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, testifying before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, described
the U.S. attitude in the following terms:

. economic recovery is a prior
necessity ; therefore the size of the
European forces must be such that they
do not interfere with recovery. And it
looks as though they will :fontinue to be
quite small for some time.
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This kind of attitude has characterized the U.S.
commitment to Allied defense ever since.
Original Formation
After the German surrender, the Western
Powers, true to the wartime pledges and to
popular demand, began to demobilize. The armed
strength of the Allied forces in Europe at the
time of the surrender of Germany was about five
million men.
One year later, following demobilization, their armed strength amounted to no
The Soviet Union, on
more than 880, 000 men.
the other hand, continued to keep its armed
forces at a wartime level. In 1945, its strength
amounted to more than four million men. It also
showed no slowing in its war industries.
The
economic assistance that was offered by the
United States during these first post-war years
was also open to the Soviet Union and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Stalin refused all
American aid for the USSR and, despite initial
interest on the part of both Czechoslovakia and
Poland, forced satellite governments to do likewise.
From the outset there were problems with
peace treaties. At a meeting in San Francisco, in
1945, the USSR and the Western powers were
unable to agree on the composition of a Polish
provisional government. At the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September of 1945,
Mr. Molotov blocked any discussion of the United
King-dom's proposal for the opening of an impartial
inquiry jnto the situation in Rumania and
Bulgaria.
The Peace Conference opened in Paris on
July 29, 1946, and peace treaties with Italy,
Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ru mania were
among the accomplishments, but they were not
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signed until Febru::iry 10, 1947. In March of that
year the Foreign Ministers met in Moscow to
discuss the drafting of peace treaties with
Germany and Austria. They were unable to agree
on what Germany's fate should be. In November
of the same year a new Foreign Ministers' Conference was held in London, but it did no more than
confirm the impossibility of agreement.
Shortly
afterward, the Soviet representatives ceased to
take part in the Allied Control Council in Berlin.
For all practical purposes, the stalemate at the
1947 Moscow Conference put an end to the
cooperation which had developed between the
USSR and the Western democratic countries during the war.
Soviet territorial expansion under Stalin had
already begun during the war by the annexation
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithmmia, together with
certain parts of Finland,
Poland,
Ru mania,
North-Eastern
Germany,
and
Eastern
Czechoslovakia.
This territorial expansion continued after the defeat of Germany and was supplemented by a policy of control over the countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Ru mania, Easte14n
Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
Because of these events, the world found
itself split into two blocs. In 1948, Mr. Ernest
Bevin, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary,
suggested a
formula for a Western union
consisting of a network of bilateral agreements
along the lines of the Dunkirk Treaty. 5 This was
a treaty signed by France and the United
Kingdom promising mutual assistance for fifty
years in the event of any renewed attempt at
aggression by Germany. Although the idea was
warmly welcomed, it was felt that the Rio Treaty
would be much better as a model because it was
an agreement between the U.S. and Latin America
to defend each other against any aggression and
provided an example of regional grouping.
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On March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was
signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
These
countries pledged themselves to build up a common defense system and to strengthen their
economic and cultural ties.
Scarcely was this
treaty signed when the Soviets started the blockade of West Berlin. It lasted for 323 days and
was only countered by the org-anization of an airlift by the Western powers. The Berlin blockade
had the definite effect of hastening the setup of a
total Western defense.
On April 28, 1948, the idea of a single
mutual defense system, including and superseding
the Brussels Treaty, was publicly put forward by
Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons.
It was recognized by all the parties
involved that it was essential that the United
States should be able, constitutionally, to join the
Atlantic
Alliance.
To
that
end,
Senator
Vandenberg drew up a resolution which recommended th~ United States' involvement in the
agreement.
This resolution was adopted on
June 11, 1948, by the U.S. Senate. The text of
the treaty was published on March 18, 1949, and
on April 4, 1949, in spite of the pressure
brought to bear by the Soviet Union on the
parties to the treaty, twelve fations joined
together and signed the document.
Subsequently, three other countries joined the twelve original signatories. Greece and Turkey were invited
to join the alliance in September, 1951, and the
Federal - Republic of Germany was invited to
accede to the treaty following the ~ignature of the
Paris Agreements in October 1954.
North Atlantic Treaty Analysis
The North Atlantic Treaty is the framework
for wide cooperation among its signatories. The
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organization is not just a military alliance but one
which also provides for continuing joint action in
the political, economic, and social fields.
It
consists of a preamble and fourteen articles.
The preamble outlines the treaty's main
features.
It emphasizes the fact that it is a
treaty for the defense of a way of life , not only
by military means, but also through all other
aspects of alliance.
The articles define the responsibilities of
each of the signatories.
They also clarify the
fact that the obligations undertaken by the
signatories are both external (the bringing about
of a better understanding of the principles upon
which Western
Civilization is founded)
and
internal
(the
strengthening
of
their
free
institutions and the elimination of disputes or
conflicts within the alliance in the economic and
social fields) . They also contain a very important
provision, namely that the parties involved agree
that an armed attack against one or more of them
in Europe or North America shall be considered
an attack against them all.
At the same time,
however, each country is free to take whatever
action it judges necessary.
This way every
armed attack does not of necessity call for an
automatic declaration of general war.
Also provided within the articles is the
possibility of revisions to the treaty or withdrawals from it. After the treaty has been in force
for ten years, the parties may agree to revise it.
After twenty years any party may put an end to
its own participation, giving one year's notice of
denunciation. As for the treaty itself, it is of
unlimited duration and will remain in force for as
long as it is considered useful, irrespective of
any decision by any individual member to
withdraw.

NATO:

THE U.S. COMMITMENT

157

Changing Perspectives of the Administrations
In the early 1950s, mechanisms were established to provide for scrutiny of the defense
efforts of NATO members. Cost sharing formulas
were also arranged to provide for financing of
NA TO "infrastructure" costs such as the expense
of facilities, services, and programs regarded to
be of common benefit to the alliance members.
The cost sharing program has operated essentially
on the "ability to pay" principle.
In earlier
times, the United StAtes agreed to pay the larg-est
share of infrastructure expenses. In subsequent
years the U.S. share has been progressively
reduced until it now constitute9 approximately 27
percent of infrastructure costs.
Since the 1950s, as Europe has become more
financially stable, the United States has continually sought a greater amount of participation
from its allies.
This participation involves not
only a military commitment, but an economic one
as well.
The Kennedy /Johnson Administrations
The Administration of President John F.
Kennedy in the early 1960s advocated a policy of
Atlantic partnership with shared responsibilities
between the United States and an eventually
united Europe. This period witnessed the beginning of the financial arrangements between the
United -States and West Germany designed to
offset the costs of stationing U.S. forces in that
country.
In 1961, the United States and West
Germany agreed to an offset program whereby
West Germany would purchase military equipment
in the United States so as to compensate for U.S.
military expenditures in West Germany.
These
agreements were renewed and expanded in later
administrations to include purchases of U.S.
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treasury bonds and, in the 1970s, repair icPf
barracks used by American forces in Germany.
During- the Johnson Administration,
the
problems with the Vietnam experience, French
withdrawal from the integrated military structure
of NATO in 1966, and U. S . economic problems
coupled with general diminished support in Congress for U.S. overseas troop commi!ments,
contributed to the administration's pressures on
the Europeans to increase their defense efforts.
All of this prompted the first of the
"Mansfield Resolutions" on August 31,
1966.
Though these resolutions and similar efforts
through 197 4 failed to win fin al passag-e, they did
force Congress and the administration to take a
hard look at the various commitments to the
treaty by the parties involved.
The resolution
judged that "the condition of our European allies,
both economically and militarily , has appreciably
improved since large contingents of forces were
deployed"; the commitment by all members of t he
North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full
cooperation of all treaty partners in contributing
materials and men on fair and equitable terms,
but
"such
contributions
have
not
been
forthcoming from all other members"; "relations
between the two parts of Europe are now
characterized by an increasing two-way flow of
trade, people, and their peaceful exchange"; and
"the
present
policy
of
maintaining
large
contingents of United States forces and their
dependents on the European Conti nent also
contribu t es further to the fiscal and monetary
problems of the United States." The Senate was
asked to resolve that "a substantial reduction of
United States Forces permanently stationed in
Europe can be made without adversely affecting
either our resolve or ability to meet rur
commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty." 1
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The Nixon /Ford Administrations
The Nixon Administration was also concerned
about C. S. balance of payments problems. But
U.S. efforts to get the .Europeans to compensate
for the U.S. presence in terms of new offset
deals, trade, or monetary concessions made little
headway with the Europeans. The allies objected
to the prospect of American troops becoming a
type of mercenary presence in Europe and argued
that the U.S. troop presence was, after all, in
America's as well as Europe's interest.
The development of the "Nixon Doctrine, 1112
first enunciated in an Asian context in Guam in
1969 and subsequently applied globally, brought a
turn away from intensive efforts to get the
Europeans to redress financial imbalances caused
by the troop presence.
U.S. policy began to
focus almost exclusively on encouraging the allies
to make improvements in their own defense capabilities. This was a sharp refocusing of U.S.
policy and set the tone for the subsequent decade. President Nixon felt that NATO's conventional forces should not only be maintained, but
in certain key areas, stren gihened. He felt that
the United States should maintain and improve its
own forces in Europe if the allies would take a
similar approach, and should not reduce them
unless there was reciprocal action from our
adversaries.
The main success of the new U.S. policy was
the encourag-ement it gave to the European allies
to intensify the work of the Eurogroup.
The
Eurogroup started as an informal caucus of
European defense ministers, meeting originally in
1968, and progressed into a very powerful body.
The first major Eurogroup project was the
European Defense IT:Provement Program announced
in December 1970.
The program represented
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about one billion dollars (1970 prices) of European
defense improvements over a five-year period. It
included increased European contributions to
NA TO infrastructure costs and special nation
force improvements.
These increased European
contributions,
along with a combination of other events in the
mid-1970s, decreased congressional press~re for
unilateral U. S. troop reductions in Europe.
A
major influence was the talks on mutual force
reductions which opened between NATO and
Warsaw Pact delegations in Vienna in 1973. The
Nixon Administration a nd the successor administration under President Gerald Ford argued that
chances of getting the Warsaw Pact countries to
reduce their forces would be undermined if the
United States reduced unilaterally. In addition,
reports of Warsaw Pact force improvements tended
to weaken the case for Western troop reductions.
On the financial front , U.S. balance of p ayments
improved considerab1f in 1975, lessening pressure
4
from that quarter.
Also, during this time
Congress became very aware of the U.S. commitment abroad, and worked on the streamlining of
U.S . forces and placed increased emphasis on
interoperability and standardization of NATO
equipment.
The Carter Administration
The policies under President Jimmy Carter
basically continued the policy approaches of the
Nixon and Ford Administr ::itions. Efforts focused
on encouraging improvements in European forces,
promoting efficiencies in alliance defense cooperation, and continuing to improve U.S. forces
committed to NATO.
In May 1977, the Carter Administration
proposed a new long-term defense program for
the alliance. An important part of this program
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was that NATO countries pledge to increase
defense expenditures in real terms 3 percent
above inflation during the life of the program.
In May 1978, a summit-level NATO meeting was
held in Washington and the program of defense
improvements that had been developed over the
preceding
year,
includ~
the
3
percent
commitment, was approved.
In 1979 and 1980, a number of factors created renewed concern about European defense
efforts.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
reinforced the consensus in the United States in
support of major increases in U.S. defense
expenditures in Europe. But most Europeans did
not interpret the invasion as a direct threat to
Europe and were therefore reluctant to see it as
requiring additional defense efforts on the part of
the allies. Furthermore, economic growth slowed
in most European countries in 1980 and 1981,
making real increases in defense spending P11_15ticularly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve .
In
1979
and
1980,
Congress
showed
increasing impatience with the defense efforts of
the allies by requiring the Secretary of Defense
to report on allied progress toward meeting the
3 percent spending objective, to describe cost
sharing arrangements within NATO, and to explain efforts being undertaken to equalize the
sharing of defense burdens with NATO allies.
The Reagan Administration
The Reagan Administration transmitted the
required report to the Congress in March 1981.
The report found that, on the average, the allies
had failed to meet the 3 percent objectives in all
three years of its existence.
The report also
stated that while failure of the allies to meet the
commitment could be seen by the Soviet Union as
a weakening of the collective resolve and could
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result in widespread shortfalls in meeting NATO
force goals, fixed percentage contributions from
allied governments are an issue of somewhat
lesser importance than development of a mutually
agreed, coherent effort to counter the Soviet
challenge. The report concluded that, based on
quantitative indicators developed for the report ,
the allies as a group appeared to be shouldering
at least their fair share of the NA TO defense
burden, with some allies carrying so~what more
than their fair share and others less.
The Reagan Administration has been very
diligent about working with U.S. allies and negotiating in good faith toward funding participation
at an equal level by all parties concerned. To
achieve this it seems that the opinions of both
sides need to be considered, and a more accurate
method of measuring the commitments of each
participating country needs to be implemented .
Measuring Defense Efforts:

Opposing Concepts

It seems that there is no one definitive way
to measure contributions to Western security.
The very selection of measuring devices depends
heavily on subjective considerations that can vary
according to di ffering national historical expe riences, threat perceptions (particularly prominent
in relationships with Europe), world roles, ideological assumptions, and concepts of security.
Furthermore , there are a number of more technical questions associated with attempts to compare
defense efforts . For example , some items, such
as the expense of military retirement programs,
are included in some defense budges while they
are excluded from others. Even more confusion
is caused when one finds that it is at least
possible to assess inputs (defense spending) by
using graphs and tables but virtually impossible
to quantify the outputs (capabilities of the forces
resulting from defense programs).

NATC:

THE U.S. COMMITMENT

163

American Perspectives
It seems that the dominant official and
unofficial American perspective on burden sharing
is that the allies should do more.
Over the
years, American observers have used a great
variety of arguments to buttress the case for
increased allied defense efforts.
The following
arfrUments have been among the most prominent:
--By all quantitative measures of expenditures, the United States spends more on defense
than its allies. In 1982, the United States spent
more on its defense bud¥§!t than the European
allies and Japan combined.
--U.S. strategic forces, which would be
essential for U.S. national security even if the
United States were not committed to participate in
European and Japanese defense, nonetheless are
the ultimate guarantee of Western security and
are essential to allied security.
--U.S. global military commitments contribute
to Western security. The global U.S. naval role,
in particular, makes a direct contribution to the
security of Western Europe to the extent that it
protects Western maritime trade and access to
vital raw materials, oil in particular.
Military
efforts in the Persian Gulf region are of increasing importance and expense to the United States.
--A major U.S. role in the defense of Europe
and Japan was warranted when our allies were
weak economically with fragile political structures,
but the economic and political maturity of the
allies now sugg-ests that they should play an
increasingly more responsible role in their own
defense.
Under the protective shield of the
United States, our allies have been able to modernize their industrial plant. The U.S. industrial
plant is on average considerably older than that
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of our allies, contributing to a competitive advantage for our allies in international trade.
--The increased threat of Soviet aggression
warrants large increases in defense spending. If
the United States is g-oing to make sacrifices to
take the le;:id in this effort, the allies should be
willing to put forth at least the same effort.
Allied Perspectives
While some allies agree that their countries
should increase their relative share of the Western defense burden, the prevalent feeling- is that
many American criticisms of their defense efforts
are unwarranted.
They feel that the United States is overreacting to the Soviet threat. They feel that the
Soviets
have
in
fact
been
weakened
by
Afghanistan and the events in Poland and will not
be tempted to attack any of the NATO allies if
already planned improvements in Western defense
are made.
Facts and Figures Put Forth by the Allies
Expenditure .
In 1981, Eurogroup contributes contributed about $80 billion to NATO's total
defense expenditure. During 1970-78 , their real
spending rose an average of about 2 percent per
year over and above inflation, so that by the end
of the 1970s, NATO allies had taken on a proportionately greater share of the commoi_r defense
burden than it carried ten years earlier. 9
Force Levels and Manpower . Of the ready
forces currently available in Europe, ;:ibout 91
percent of the ground forces and 86 percent of
the air forces come from European countries, as

NATO:

THE U.S. COMMITMENT

165

do 75 percent of NATO's tanks and more than 90
percent of its armored divisions. The size of the
armed forces of European countries amounts in
peacetime to some 3 million, rising to nearly 6
million when reserves with an assigned role in
mobilization are included.
The North A~ rican
figures are 2 .15 million, rising to 3 million. 0
Other Contributions by the Allies.
Some
allied contributions to Western defense cannot be
measured in terms of defense expenditures alone.
West Germany, for example, contributes a great
deal of real estate to the support of NATO
forces. The costs of foregoing other productive
uses of that real estate and of lost tax revenues
are substantial.
Continuing Arguments by the Allies.
The
allies argue that Americans cannot understand
Scandinavian approaches to defense without taking
into account the tradition of small standing forces
combined with far more extensive civilian participation in contingency war plans through the
integration of reserve and militia forces in territorial defense plans than is the case in the United
States.
Also, because most continental allies
maintain some form of conscription, manpower
costs are lower than the costs incurred by the
United States for volunteer service.
Both Britain and France continue to maintain
strategic nuclear forces which enhance the deterrence effect of U.S . capabilities. Over the last
thirty years, the allies have purchased far more
military equipment from the United States than
the United States has purchased from allied arms
manufacturers. U.S. industrial profits, employment, and balance of payments have all benefited
from this fairly one-sided trade.
These various arguments coming from both
sides have shaped the relationship within NATO
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for years now, but in recent times another very
important burden sharing issue has come to have
a great effect on that relationship.
Third World Security as a
Burden Sharing Issue
How to interpret and deal with p9tential
threats to Western security arising outside of
NATO's boundaries has been one of the most
difficult burden sharing issues for the alliance in
recent years.
With the Iranian crisis and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. felt that
the West had need to strengthen its military
posture in the Persian Gulf region. The threat
in this region was seen by the U.S. as a continuum of Soviet threats with which Europe had just
as much reason to be concerned as the United
States. Out of this perception grew demands for
European contributions to security in the region
through increased European defense efforts in
Europe to provide greater flexibility for the U.S.
to shift resources to Persian Gulf contingencies.
The Europeans, taking a different point of
view, were of the opinion that the instability in
the Persian Gulf area was most likely the result
of factors indigenous to Middle Eastern countries
and conflicts among regional countries (e.g., the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq war), and not
Soviet subversion or indirect involvement in the
region (e.g., aid t2 PLO, Syria, and indigenous
1
Communist parties) .
The different perspectives taken by the
United States and its allies come from differing
national roles, capabilities, and historical experiences. The United States is a global power with
global military capabilities while the European
nations are, with the exception of France and to
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a lesser extent Great Britain, regional ~owers
with military capabilities limited to Europe. 2
The decline over the last thirty years in
Europe's ability to influence events in the Third
World w::is accompanied by an evolving strategic
approach to Third World problems.
European
policies became increasingly dependent on political
and economic instruments to influence events in
the Third World.
The American experience in
Vietnam confirmed for many Europeans the wisdom
of using military force as a last resort in the
Third World.
West European leaders, for the most part,
t::ike the position that the West derives considerable security from the needs of Third World
countries for access to Western markets and
technology. They also believe that similar Soviet
requirements for Western technology and other
Western goods, such as wheat, tend to constrain
Soviet temptations to intervene in Third World
trouble spots. They are inclined to believe that
instead of a military intervention, in many cases
Western interests can be more effectively advanced by developing economic ties with Third
World nations. On the whole, the Europeans can
be expected to use military power only when
political and economic approaches have failed and
vital interests are threatened. Both France and
Great Britain, however, and a few other European
countries, retain some capability for militflry
involvement in the Third World, particularly in
Africa and the Middle East, and their use of that
capability is not totally excluded. Both France
and Italy have demonstrated by their participation
in the multinational force in Lebanon that
European military contributions to Western interests in the Third World are not out of the question. It seems, though, that the European allies
will continue to resist any formal linkage between
the
NA TO
commitments
and
Third
World
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contingencies, meaning that the Europeans will
continue to oppose any formal extension of
NATO's boundaries.
Technical Problems with Measuring
The problems with measuring the various
commitments to burden sharing within NATO are
not only limited to political, social, or ec_onomic
factors, there are in addition a number of technical difficulties that make measuring these appropriate shares of the Western defense burden
difficult.
These problems include fluctuating
currency exchange
rates,
differing
national
approaches to defense budgeting, and the fact
that no quantitative methods effectively measure
the quality or will of military forces. Therefore,
determining what constitutes an equitable sharing
of alliance burdens is , ultimately , a very subjective political process.
Policy Options for the U. S.
If the policymakers within the United States
decide that, in principle, the allies should make a
greater contribution, there are a number of
different approaches that need to be taken into
consideration . At the level of high policy, the
choice of approaches depends on the value attached to alliance relationships by the participants.
For example, the U.S. contributions to
NATO defenses and security are perceived by the
governments of all NATO allies as a vital element
of their national security. They therefore want
the contribution to continue, which creates a
certain amount of leverage that the United States
can use to influence the allies' policies and defense spending.

The values that American observers place on
our alliance relationships can also influence policy
approaches to a certain degree. Those who see
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little selfrinterest in U.S. defense commitments to
Europe would likely be willing to risk far more
acrimony in relation ships with the allies. If one
believes that there is no compelling political or
military rationale, in terms of U.S. interest, for
the presence of sizable contingents of U.S. forces
in Europe, then the threat of withdrawal of these
forces may be a credible source of leverage. On
the other hand, those who see basic commitments
to the defense of Europe as clearly beneficial to
U.S. interests would presumably _want to work
within the context of those commitments to encourage lare:er allied contributions to Western
security.
Once it is accepted that the U.S.
commitment is derived from self-interest rather
than from any sense of charity, there are some
constraints on the levers available to pressure the
allies. The risks of rupturing the alliance relationship are greatly reduced under this assumption, and, for better or worse, the possibilities
for fundamental changes in the relationship are
diminished. Since World War II this approach has
g-enerally characterized U.S. policy toward the
defense efforts of its allies.
Legislative Approaches
The U.S. Congress cannot require the allies
to increase defense efforts. The Congress can,
however, require the administration to take
actions to increase pressure on the allies or can
provide the administration with levers to "use"
the allies. The most direct approach is through
the defense authorization process. Amendment of
::mthorization bills has been used in the past to
deny funds for activities that the Cong-ress
decided should more appropriately be funded by
an ally. For example, the FY82 authorization bill
on military construction "killed" a 6. 4 million
dollar authorization to harden logistical facilities
for tactical aircraft in Europe, on the g-rouncL,3hat
NA TO as a whole should pay these expenses."
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Even if the threat of massive troop withdrawals is foregone as too extreme, some members
of Congress might want to use the threat of
marginal reductions as a means of pressuring the
allies to improve their own defense efforts, to
contribute more to the costs of the U.S. presence, or both.
Summary
While it is understood that a subject as
broad as this one can take up many volumes, the
purpose of this paper has been to explain what
the current policy toward burden sharing within
NATO is, and to help clarify where those policies
may take us in the future.
From this perspective, it seems that the
burden sharing problem is inherent in the structure of the alliance systems that the United States
developed following World War II.
U. S defense
commitments arise from the perception that Soviet
dominance in Western Europe would pose a
long-term threat to U. S. economic well-being and
national security.
That perception, plus allied
weakness in the 1940s and early 1950s, underlies
the structure of our alliance systems and has
determined U.S . force structures which give rise
to relatively high costs for the United States . If
the United States wants to encourage increased
defense efforts while simultaneously sustaining a
broad base of support for the alliance in Europe,
then policies must be designed with greRt sensitivity to the political and economic circumstances
in the allied countries. Forms of pressure that
produce friction but no increases in defense
efforts would, from this perspective , be counterproductive for U. S . interests.
Self-interest naturally dictates that U.S.
officials should try to get the allies to do whatever will relieve the defense burden confronting the
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American people. Similarly, European officials see
it as their responsibility to pursue defense
spending policies consistent with their political
mandates and responsibilities.
The view from this perspective is that the
allies should do somewhat more than they are now
doing, but that the United States should approach
this subject with a policy that seeks to understand the European commitment by both input and
output. The U.S. should not just consider the
dollar amounts that are committed, but the
economic capabilities in relation to that commitment
as well.
In summary, barring any unexpected and
dramatic security threats, the current expectation
is for trends in allied spending patterns to continue as they have in the recent past. There will
probably be no substantial shifts in the apportionment of Western defense burdens without
overall reductions in allied defense capabilities
unless they should come as a product of arms
control agreements with the Soviet Union.
As
long as the underlying perceptions and alliance
structures remain valid and the United States
wishes to remain a global power, the United
States will likely continue to spend more on
defense than its allies.
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The Eurog-roup
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Table 1:

U.S. Forces Stationed in Europe*
(as of September 30, 1982)
ARMY

Belgium
1,469
Germany (incl. Berlin)
218,215
663
Greece
Greenland
2
Iceland
Italy
4,538
Netherhmds
779
Norway
35
62
Portugnl
22
Spain
Turkey
1,229
United King-dom
184
Afloat
227j270
TOTAL IN EUROPE
(227,245)
(TOTAL COMMITTED
TO NATO)
NATO FORCES ::is % of TOTAL 28%

NAVY

MARINE
CORPS
32
90
15

AIR
FORCE

1 , 708
3,999
15
31
347
3,650
77
2,291
26,621
39,564
(12,938)

13
13
194
19
334
5,932
7,224
(1,216)

81,575
(81,588)

2,261
256,391
3,540
325
2,871
13,055
2,578
194
1,505
8,950
5,162
25,893
32,553
355,633
(322,957)

2%

0.05%

13%

14.5%

115

288
390

109
261
9

645
37,798
2,472
325
1,052
4,257
1,775

TOTAL
DoD

115

1,083
5,084
3,837
23,084

*The continuing resolution for FY83 defense appropriations froze levels of
U.S. troops "on shore" in Europe at 315, 600.

Table 2:

--

NATO Defense Efforts

Defense Spending 1981(comparisons corrected for inflation)
Total
armed forces
109,000
81,000
31,000
578,000
495,000
186,000
517,000
1,000
106,000
40,000
91,000
347,000
769,000
335,000
2,189,000

% change from
previous year
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

4-year avg
% change

0.2
3.0
0 .1 •
3.5
3.4
5.6
-1.2
7.1
3.4
2.5
2.8

2.77
1. 75
1.35
3.97
2.55
-0.3
1.93
8.7
0.25
3.48
4.55

3.1
2.1
5.4

1.95
1.8
3.78

---

----

as a % of
GDP
3. 3
1.8
2.5
4.2
3.4
5. 9
2.5
1.3
3.2
2.9
3.6
1.9
4.8
5. 0 .
5.8

as a % of
gov't
spending
9.2
8.3
7.3
20.7
28.2
20.3
5.6
3.5
9.7
9.0
10.9
11. 7
20.7
12.1
25.3
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PI SIGMA ALPHA ACTIVITIES 1984-1985
Dialogue and Doughnuts
Michael Novak, noted author
columnist, initiated the year's
discussing liberation theology in
He also provided insights into
capitalist pluralism could play in
the world.

and newspaper
activities by
Latin America.
the role that
that region of

Duke University professor and specialist on
the U.S. presidency, James David Barber, spoke
on 11 The Personality of the President."
The Baroness Lady Cox, a member of the
British House of Lords, talked about the influence
of Marxism in the English educational system.
Strobe Talbot, foreign correspondent for
TIME, addressed the topic of the arms race and
the
Soviet
Union's
re-entry
into
arms
negotiations.
Elizabeth Picard, a member of France's
National Foundation of Political Science, spoke on
"Communal Identities and Political Moblization in
Lebanon."
U.S.
Representative
Howard
Nielson
CR-Utah) discussed current political issues.
Thomas E.
Cronin,
former White House
Fellow and aide as well as author of The State of
the Presidency, talked about formal and informal
power structures.
Jim Kearl of the B YU Economics Department
and a recent White House Fellow with the
Pentagon,
spoke
on
the
current
problems
surrounding- arms technology, methods of troop
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training, and the size and cost of conventional
forces.
John Ayoade, visiting professor at the
University of Pennsylvania and faculty member of
Ibandan University in Nigeria, discussed Nigerian
foreign policy .
Bishara Bah bah, visiting professor witp the
BYU Political Science Department and former
editor of Al-Fajr Newspaper in Jerusalem, talked
about the problems faced by the Palestinian
people living in the Israeli-occupied territories.
Gilbert Y.
Steiner
of
the
Brookings
Institution and the current occupant of the
Camilla Eyring Kimball Chair of Home and Family
Life addressed the evolution of the Social Security
Act and the many- faceted problems of welfare
policy.
Ron Hinckley , a member of the National
Security Council, spoke on "Presidential Decision
Making: Why Facts Don't Matter."
Welches and Cheese
Pi
Sigma
Alpha
members
viewed
the
Bush-Ferraro
Vice
Presidential
debate
at
Dr. Richard
Vetterli's
home.
Afterward,
Dr. David Magleby led a discussion on the
debate.
Professor Ray Hillam hosted the annual PSA
"Oktoberfest" at his cabin in the Wasatch Alps.
Professor Stan Taylor, Director of the
David M. Kennedy International Center, spoke on
the topic of "Terrorism."
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Dr. David Bohn invited PSA students to his
home and discussed possible strategies for
lessening tension and costs in the nuclear arms
race.
PSA members met at Dr. Ladd Hollist's home
and heard him talk about military and economic
options in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
Having recently returned to BYU from duties
as a special assistant to the U.S . Trade
Representative, Dr. Earl Fry talked about the
pros and cons of increased direct foreign
investment in the United States.
The last Welches and Cheese was held at Dr.
LaMond Tullis' home.
Dr. Tullis discussed the
politics of world hunger and food aid.
The keynote speaker at the annual Pi Sigma
Alpha closing social and awards banquet was
Professor Charles Jones of the University of
Virginia. Professor Jones is the current national
President of Pi Sigma Alpha.
Colloquia
Papers presented this year by the Political
Science faculty to Pi Sigma Alpha included the
following:
"The Jewish Past and Mormon History:
Challer-iges to the Foundations."
--Dr. Louis Midgley

Some

"The Current View on Rural Development:
Fad or Breakthrough in Latin America?"
--Dr. LaMond Tullis
"The Political Function of First Nephi."
--Dr. Noel Reynolds
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"Moral Controversies and Public Policy:
Politics of Equal Employment Opportunity
Affirmative Action."
--Dr. Gary Bryner

The
and

FACULTY NOTES
Donna Lee Bowen presented a paper to the
Middle East Studies Association in Philadelphia
entitled "Literature as a Pedagogical Device in the
Study of Middle East Culture. IT She traveled to
Aix-en-Provence, France, to present another
paper, "Paradoxical Linkage of Ulama and Monarch
in Morocco," which has been published in The
Mahgreb Review. Dr. Bowen is also the author
of "Women and Public Health in Morocco:
One
Family's Experience," in Women and Family in the
Middle East, Elizabeth Fernea, ed. , University of
Texas Press, 1985.
David Bohn was a fellow at Bern University
in Switzerland during the summer of 1984.
Gary Bryner has served during the last year
on a grants panel for the National Endowment of
Humanities.
He chaired two conferences on the
U.S. Constitution held at BYU in .Tune 1984 and
January 1985. He also presented a paper to the
American Political Science Association on "Science,
Law, and Regulatory Policy."
Lee Farnsworth has continued to edit his
"Newsletter of Research on Japanese Politics" for
the Japanese Studies Group of the American
Political Science Association.
He presented a
paper to the International Studies Association
entitled "United States-Japan Relations: Nagging
and Dragging" and has written a review of William
Watts' book, The United States and Japan:
A
Troubled Partnership, forthcoming in the Journal
of Asian and African Studies.
Dean Martin Hickman spoke on Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes at the conference on the U.S.
Constitution in June 1984.
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Ladd Hollist and F. LaMond Tullis have
recently had the book they have been editing, An
International Political Economy, published by
Westview Press. The book is the first volume of
a yearbook for the International Political Economy
Section of the International Studies Association
that will be edited annually by Professors Hollist
and Tullis . In addition , Dr. Hollist presented a
paper at the International Studies Assocj.ation
conference in Washington, D. C.
The paper is
entitled "American Foreign Policy and Newly
Industrializing Countries . "
Earl Fry has had several publications within
the last year. One is an article, "Sectoral Free
Trade," published in the October 1984 issue of
International Perspectives : The Canadian Journal
of World Affairs . He has published a book with
Lee H. Radebaugh entitled Canada/U . S. Trade
Relations through the BYU David M. Kennedy
Center.
Also, the second edition of Dr . Fry's
Canadian Government and Politics in Comparative
Perspective has been released by University Press
of America.
David B. Magleby presented a paper on "Mail
Ballot Elections" at the American Political Science
Association meeting .
His publications for the
year include the study guide that accompanies
Everett Carl Ladd ' s The American Polity, an
11rticle on voter apathy that appeared in B YU
Today, and a book entitled Direct LegislaiiOri":
Voting
on
Ballot
Propositions
(Baltimore ,
l\faryland :
Johns Hopkins University Press ,
1984).
Louis Midgley presented a paper entitled
"Dogmatic Belief and Public Virtue:
Alexis De
Tocqueville on the Virility of Religion" at
Claremont College at a conference on "Democracy
in America: Alexis De Tocqueville Observes the
New Order . "

FACTJLTY NOTES

187

Noel Reynolds participated on the National
Endowment of Humanities Study Group on the
State of Learning in Higher Education.
He
presented a paper at a conference on George
Orwell at Cambridge University and a paper at
Notre
Dame
University.
They were titled
respectively "Big Brother: The Abuse of Power"
and "Families and Markets: Allies or Enemies."
Stan Taylor gave the annual lecture at the
Command and General Staff College of Maxwell Air
Force Base in October 1984.
He was also a
participant at the U.S. Intelligence Conference
held at C. I. A. headquarters. Dr. Taylor serves
as a member of the Charles A. Lindbergh
Foundation
Grant
Panel
on
the
Thrasher
Foundation Committee.
Dennis L. Thompson chaired a panel on
religion and politics at the meeting of the Western
Political Science Association.
He presented a
paper to the Association for Arid Land Studies
entitled "Interface on Culture and Politics in Arid
Lands."
A second paper presented at the
Ogallala Aquifer Symposium at Texas Tech., in
Lubbock, Texas, was on the "Interstate Relations
of Ground Water."
He also organized the
International Political Science Association Politics
and Ethnicity Round Table at Glasgow, Scotland.
He co-edited a book for Westview Press and was
Secretary-Treasurer of the International Political
Science Association's Research Committee on
Politics and Ethnicity.
Dr.
Thompson also
lectured for
the
United States Information
Agency,
was
a
visiting
scholar
at
the
C. E. R. D. I. C. Faculty of Common Law, University
of Strausberg, and wrote an article "De Chaque
Cot~ de la Porte:
L'Entas~ et la Sortie de L'Eglise
«Mormon» - Pruxis Jurf dique Et Religion for the
C.E.R.D.I.C.
In addition,
he authored a
chapter, "Legislated Federalism," in a book
published by J. A. I. Press which is called
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Public Policy and Physical Environment.
Keith Melville served on the panel
Sterling Scholars for the state of Utah.

for

Richard Vetterli is on sabbatical leave and is
serving as a visiting professor at Claremont
College and the University of California at Irvine.
Carwin C. Williams presented a paper on
"The Two-Party System in Utah" at the Round
Table of the 1985 annual meeting of the Utah
Political Science Association. He also presented,
with co-author Carolynn Garrison a paper on
"Urban Housing Initiatives" at the Urban Affairs
Association in Oregon.
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